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THE STRUCTURE OF PUNISHMENT
NORMS: APPLYING THE ROSSI-BERK
MODEL
JOSEPH E. JACOBY* & FRANCIS T. CUL"EN*

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades research on the nature of public
attitudes toward crime and punishment has grown substantially.1
Much of this research has been descriptive, reporting "what the
public thinks" about various crime-related issues. When conceptual frameworks are used to explore the organizing principles of public opinion, they are largely dominated by the
ongoing debate between consensus and conflict theory.2 Researchers typically comment on the implications of their findings for this debate: Do citizens fundamentally agree or disagree

Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Bowling Green State University
" Distinguished Research Professor, Division of CriminalJustice, University of Cincinnati
I See generallyJulian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and CriminalJustice,in CRIME
ANDJUSrTcE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992); LorettaJ. Stalans &
ArthurJ. Lurigio, Editors' Introduction, Public OpinionAbout the Creation,Enforcement,
and Punishment of Criminal Offenses, 39 AM. BEHAvIORAL SCIENTIST 369 (1996); Mark
Warr, Public Perceptions and Reactions to Volent Offending and Victimization, in 4
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE: CONSEQUENCES AND CONTROL 1 (Albert J.
Reiss, Jr. &Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1995) [hereinafter Warr,PublicPerceptions].
2 As is well known, consensus theory argues that there is widespread agreement in
society about what should or should not be illegal. Laws and legal sanctions are thus
seen as reflecting the "will of the people." In contrast, conflict theory contends that
groups in society, based on competing political and/or economic interests, differ in
their views of what should be declared illegal and of what penalties lawbreaking
should elicit. Accordingly, laws and legal sanctions are seen as reflecting the ability of
competing groups to exercise power and have their interests represented in the
criminal law and in the administration of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Charles
W. Thomas et al., Public Opinion on CriminalLaw and Legal Sanctions: An Examination of
Two Conceptual Models, 67J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 110 (1976); Mark Warr et al.,
ContendingTheories of CriminalLaw: Statutory PenaltiesVersus Public Preferences, 19 J. RES.
CRIME & DEIuNQ. 25 (1982) [hereinafter Warr et al., ContendingTheories].

JACOBY & CULLE[

[Vol. 89

on the rules that should govern society? Findings of attitudinal
agreement or consensus about the seriousness of crime or appropriate punishments for offenders are taken as evidence in
favor of consensus theory; cleavages in opinion between social
groups-especially along race and class lines-are taken as support for conflict theory. Only rarely, however, do researchers
test a full range of hypotheses systematically derived from these
competing theories.
Although this body of research has value, the dominance of
the consensus/conflict debate may have stifled the development
of alternative approaches to examining crime attitudes. It is instructive that the empirical studies attempting to resolve
whether consensus or conflict best describes a normative domain typically produce ambiguous results.8 Researchers seldom
find either universal normative consensus or consensus clearly
differentiated by interest group membership. Instead they find
variation-more intra-individual variation than supports consensus theory and less intra-group variation than supports conflict theory.
It is possible that the "ambiguous" findings of analysis oriented around the consensus/conflict debate are a consequence
of the limited vision of both perspectives. The patterns of
norms that exist in the real world are not "ambiguous," though
they are not explained adequately by either of the dominant
perspectives. These perspectives may oversimplify the range of
potential normative structures (i.e., normative structures may
exist outside the types that are logically derived from either consensus or conflict theory).
Accordingly, we suggest that criminologists studying the
structure of crime attitudes should move beyond consensus and
conflict theories as guides for their research by employing more
comprehensive, sophisticated models. To this end, we use an

" See, e.g., Stalans & Lurigio, supra note 1 (Stalans and Lurigio cite evidence and
arguments that support both the conflict and consensus models. In support of the
consensus model, they cite numerous studies revealing public consensus around
which behaviors are harmful and wrong, as well as widespread public support for the
courts and police. In support of the conflict model they site the sharp division along
racial lines of the justice of the verdict in the O.J. Simpson murder trial.)
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analytical model introduced by Peter Rossi and Richard Berk.4
The Rossi-Berk model offers a general sociological approach to
investigating and mapping normative structures. We apply this
model to data gathered through a national survey of public attitudes toward the punishment of street crimes.
The Rossi-Berk model, which is described in detail below,
has advantages over both consensus and conflict theory as a
guide to exploring normative structures:
1. The Rossi-Berk model is rooted in empirical observation,
not ideology. Unlike both consensus and conflict theories, the
Rossi-Berk model's validity does not depend on whether consensus or dissensus exists in any normative domain. Scholars
embracing either of these competing theories, having a stake in
finding or not finding consensus in public attitudes, must treat
findings anomalous to their paradigm as somehow not reflecting reality. Consensus theorists dismiss inconsistencies between
public opinion and public policy as products of misinformation
caused by the entertainment media.5 Conflict theorists dismiss
evidence of widespread public agreement on some issues, asserting that survey respondents who express attitudes divergent
from their "class interests" are exhibiting "false consciousness."
Though the existence of false consciousness may be impossible
to test empirically, it is an effective rhetorical response to evidence that challenges the validity of the conflict model.
2. The purpose of the Rossi-Berk model is to provide a
comprehensive tool that may be used to determine whether
norms exist and what those norms are in any normative domain.
Consensus theory, which is rooted in the sociological theory of
structural-functionalism, has little to say about normative domains that are not clearly connected to common interests that
contribute to the survival of the society; conflict theory has little
to say about normative domains that are not clearly related to

4 Peter H. Rossi & Richard A. Berk, Varieties of Normative Consensius, 50 AM. Soc.
REV. 333, 333-47 (1985) [hereinafter Rossi & Berk, Varieties];Peter H. Rossi & Richard
A. Berk, A Conceptual Framework for Measuring Norms, in THE SOCIAL FABRic:
DIMENSIONS AND ISSUES 77 (James F. Short, Jr. ed., 1986) [hereinafter Rossi & Berk,
ConceptualFramework].
' Stalans & Lurigio, supranote 1, at 370.
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groups' political interests. Many normative domains, apparently, do not lend themselves to either consensus or conflict
analysis because they are unrelated to either society's survival or
groups' political interests.6
3. The Rossi-Berk model is designed to deal with the full
spectrum of variability of normative judgments-from absolute
consensus to absolute dissensus-wherever it exists-within individuals, between individuals in the same group, and between
groups of individuals. The model covers the entire range of
logically possible normative structures. Neither consensus nor
conflict theory predicts the wide variety of patterns of public
opinion that actually exist.
4. The Rossi-Berk model is "comfortable" with the continuum of consensus-dissensus that occurs in the real world. Unlike both consensus and conflict theory, the Rossi-Berk model
does not require the arbitrary creation of dichotomous categories labeled "consensus" and "dissensus."
5. Neither consensus nor conflict theory suggests any particular methods for testing its validity. The precise language of
the Rossi-Berk model provides clear guidance to empirical application of the model through the measurement of variation of
normative judgments within each individual, between individuals, and among groups of individuals.
6. Applying the model to a normative domain clarifies how
that normative domain is structured relative to other normative
domains.
7. Applying the model to the same normative domain in
many cultures could clarify whether normative structures are
universal or unique to each culture.
8. Applying the model to a large number of normative domains creates the possibility of theorizing about norms at a
higher level of abstraction, by revealing whether all normative

6

Conflict and consensus theorists, of course, do not write about phenomena they

cannot explain from their perspectives. Examples of normative domains that seem
unrelated to society's survival or any group's political interests (and are therefore incapable of being explained by either consensus or conflict analysis) might include the
public's preferences for different styles of clothing and varieties of food.
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domains are structured similarly or some domains have unique
structures.
9. The Rossi-Berk model exists outside the structuralfunctionalism/conflict debate, but applying the model to specific normative domains produces empirical findings that can
answer questions raised in that debate.
10. The Rossi-Berk model reconnects the study of crime
and deviance to the field of sociology.7 The study of normative
structures uses the concepts and methods of sociology, and is of
interest to sociologists studying all kinds of human behavior.
II. STUDYING NORMATIW STRUCTURES
A. IMPORTANCE

The shape of normative consensus regarding criminal punishment has important implications for punishment policy and
the very legitimacy of criminal justice institutions and processes:
"[P]ublic opinion research can provide information about people's perceptions of the legitimacy of laws and the institutions
that are designed to uphold, protect, and enforce them."8 At a
deeper level, however, it may be equally important to understand how people formulate their preferences about punishment. What qualities of crimes, offenders, and victims do
people consider relevant to punishment? How do people combine the qualities they consider relevant, leading them to select
a particular punishment? In other words, what norms guide
their choice of punishments?
An understanding of normative behavior is central to most
social science conceptual schemes. 9 Norms identify deviant be7 The field of sociology is concerned with the structure of social relations, generally. The deterrence, rational choice, control, and biological theories that are currently prominent in criminology are not concerned with these broader issues, so
criminological studies applying those theories do not inform the broader field.
8
Stalans & Lurigio, supra note 1, at 371.
See generally Judith Blake & Kingsley Davis, Norms, Values, and Sanctions, in
HANDBOOK OF MODERN SocIOLOGY 456 (Robert E.L. Faris ed., 1964); V. Lee Hamilton
& Steve Rytina, Social Consensus on Norms ofjustice: Should the PunishmentFit the Crime?,
85 AM.J. Soc. 1117 (1980); Robert F. Meier, Norms and the Study of Deviance:A Proposed
Research Strategy, 3 DEVIANT BEHAV. 1 (1981); Terance D. Miethe, Public Consensus on
Crime Seriousness: Normative Structure or MethodologicalArtifact?, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 515
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havior and, relevant to our concerns, prescribe punishments for
transgressors. The existence of normative standards is indicated
when public opinion is characterized by high degrees of consensus and stability. Knowledge of this normative structure,
however, is complicated by the difficulties associated with identifying empirically stable, enduring public preferences. In particular, research on norms has been hindered by two issues: how
to measure them, and how to distinguish them from more idiosyncratic preferences.
B. CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENT MEASUREMENT STRATEGIES

As noted above, a growing body of research has emerged on
public attitudes toward the punishment of crime. Although
these studies have provided useful insights about punishment
norms, they have tended to be limited by one or more methodological problems. First, most public opinion polls about
punishment have called for general responses to very complex
questions stated in simple terms. 10 They have not evaluated subtleties in judgments. People have been asked, for example: "In
general, do you think the courts in your area deal too harshly,
or not harshly enough with criminals?"" When asked this question, 85% of respondents to a 1994 national poll responded
"not harshly enough," revealing general dissatisfaction with
Respondents were not asked
judges' sentencing practices.
what they believed such practices to be or what practices they
preferred. This apparent consensus, therefore, reveals neither
respondents' policy preferences nor the norms underlying
those preferences.
This criticism applies in particular to conventional polling
techniques (e.g., Gallup Polls), whose results often are disseminated widely in the media, strongly influencing policy makers'
(1982); John F. Stolte, The Formation of Justice Norms, 52 AM. Soc. REv. 774 (1987);
Mark Warr et al., Norms, Theories ofPunishment,and Publicly PreferredPenaltiesfor Crimes,
24 Soc. Q. 75 (1983) [hereinafter Warr et al., Norms].
" Michael G. Turner et al., Public Tolerancefor Community-Based Sanctions,77 PRISON
J. 6, 6-9 (1997).

" Id. at 7.

2 BuRAu oF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL

JuSTICE STATIsnCS-1995, at 173 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1996)
[hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
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understanding of "public opinion." 3 The broad questions
posed in traditional public opinion polls reveal little about
normative structure. Such questions de-contextualize punishment choices from real-life situations where punishment is applied. They do not simulate actual decision making by people
confronted with real punishment decisions (in the courtroom,
for example), so they cannot reveal the norms guiding those
real decisions. General questions about punishment tend to
elicit very punitive responses characterizing the public's general
fear of crime and dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system,
rather than carefully thought-out punishment preferences appropriate for specific situations.
Indeed, Thomson compares the results of typical public
opinion polls with other types of studies."' Thomson claims that
public opinion polls that provide little information about specific crimes appeal to fear and outrage, eliciting emotional responses, much like the reactions of a vigilante mob: "Given
something like the distorted and insufficient information and
visceral incentives of a crowd, they respond something like a
crowd. Hang the criminals. 16Impeach the judges. Build more
prisons. Hang the criminals."
Much academic research, as might be anticipated, is more
sophisticated and more valuable in furnishing information on
punishment norms; but it is not without limitations. Conventional polling techniques have the potential advantage of national coverage, but with the exception of the National Survey
13

See JULIAN V.

ROBERTS & LORETrA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND

293-94 (1997). See also TimothyJ. Flanagan, Public Opinion and Public Policy in CriminalJustice, in AMERICANS' VIEW OF CRIME AND JUSTICE: A NATIONAL
PUBLIC OPINION SuRVEY 151, 152-54 (TimothyJ. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire, eds.,
1996).
" Brandon . Applegate et al., AssessingPublicSupportfor Three Strikes-and-You're Out
Laws: Global versus Speciftc Attitudes, 42 CRIME & DELNQ. 517, 528-30 (1996) [hereinafter Applegate et al., Assessing Public Support]; Anthony N. Doob & Julian V. Roberts,
Social Psychology, Social Attitudes, and Attitudes Toward Sentencing, 16 CANADiANJ. BEHAV.
Sci. 269, 277 (1984).
" See generaly Douglas R. Thomson, Discordant Images of Public Sentiments Toward Criminal Sanctions (1988) (Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Law
and Society Association in Vail, Colorado, on file with author).
SId. at 20.
CRmNALJusncE
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of Crime Severity,17 virtually all these studies are based on student, community, or at most, state-wide samples.'8 Further, with
few exceptions, 9 many studies do not ask respondents to specify
the actual punishments they would prefer for a given criminal
event. Instead, they use rating tasks-such as response scales
measuring seriousness, general punitiveness, or the fairness of a
punishment meted out-that are one step removed from specific judgments on concrete sentencing preferences.2
Most important, the standard design used in traditional
academic research-asking respondents to judge the seriousness of, or apply punishments to, lengthy lists of criminal offenses-is potentially limited by the core problem found in
conventional polling techniques: decontextualized ratings that
do not approximate decision making in real-life situations.
Thus, respondents are given limited information about a criminal event-in this case, information that varies primarily along
only two dimensions, the type of crime and degree of harm
caused by the offense.2' As a result, the data produced by this
" See MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJuSTICE, THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF
CRaME SE VERriY (1985).
" See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Sentencing of Convicted Offenders:
An Analysis of the Public's View, 14 L. & Soc. REv. 223 (1980); Alexis M. Durham, Crime
Seriousness and Punitive Severity: An Assessment of Social Attitudes, 5 JusT. Q. 131 (1988);
Sandra S. Evans & Joseph E. Scott, The Seriousness of Crime Cross Culturally, 22
CRInMNOLOGY39 (1984); Hamilton & Rytina, supranote 9; Peter H. Rossi et al., The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 224
(1974) [hereinafter Rossi, et al., Seriousnessof Crimes]; Warr et al., Norms, supranote 9.
'9See, e.g., Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 18; L. Thomas Winfree, Jr. & Larry E.
Williams, UnderstandingPublic Support for Punitive CriminalSanctions: Psychological and
Sociological Vriews of the 'Outlier'Phenomenon,6 Soc. SPECrRum 179 (1986).
2°See e.g., Francis T. Cullen et al., The Seriousness of Crime Revisited: Are Attitudes Toward White-CollarCrime Changing?,20 CRIMINOLOGY 83, 85-87 (1982) [hereinafter Cullen et al., Seriousness of Crime Revisited]; Colin Goff & Nancy Nason-Clark, The
Seriousness of Crime in Fredericton, New Brunswick: Perceptions Toward White-Collar Crime,
31 CANADiANJ. CRnINOLOGY 19, 22-24 (1989); Rossi et al., Seriousness of Crimes, supra
note 18, at 227-29; WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 17, at 2.
" See, e.g., Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 18, at 228; Roland Chilton & Jan DeAmicas, Overcriminalizationand the Measurement of Consensus, 59 SoC. & Soc.RES. 319,
323 (1975); Cullen et al., Seriousness of Crime Revisited, supra note 20, at 88-91; Francis
T. Cullen et al., Dissecting White-Collar Crime: Offense Type and Punitiveness, 9 INT'LJ.
APPLED & CowP. CRiM.JusT. 15, 20-21 (1985); Goff & Nason-Clark, supra note 20, at
29; Darnell F. Hawkins, Perceptionsof Punishmentfor Crime, 1 DEVIANT BEHAV. 193, 198
(1980); Rossi et al., Seriousness of Crimes, supra note 18, at 228-29; Peter G. Sinden, Per-
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research are limited in their ability to illuminate the way people
make real choices about complicated issues, where highly differentiated normative structures with conflicting principles are
involved.22
Criminologists have recognized this potential limitation and
have used vignette methodology to provide respondents with a
rating task that approximates more closely the information
available in real-life crime events.2s The first generation of vignette research, however, was faced with the daunting problem
that varying too many dimensions in the vignette would produce
exponential growth in the number of vignettes respondents
would have to rate. Accordingly, these studies tended to vary
only a few theoretically salient factors (e.g., culpability and
harm) 2
Factorial survey methodology, however, overcomes this
problem by permitting multiple dimensions of a crime event to
vary randomly across vignettes to be rated.2 Although the complexity of real-life crime events can never be duplicated fully,
factorial design vignettes operationalize these events more ade-

ceptions of Crime in CapitalistAmerica: The Question of ConciousnessManipulation,13 SoC.
Focus 75, 79 (1980); Thomas et al., supra note 2, at 112-13; Winfree & Williams, supra
note 19, at 191-92; WOL.GANGET AL, supra note 17, at 247-50.
' David Indermaur, Public Perceptions of Sentencing in Perth, Western Australia, 20
AUSRALIAN & NEw ZEALANDJ. CRIMINOLoGY 163, 176-80 (1987); Douglas A. Thomson
& Anthony J. Ragona, PopularModeration versus Governmental Authoritarianism:An InteractionistView ofPublic Sentiments Toward CriminalSanctions, 33 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
337, 339-41 (1987).
' See, e.g., Brandon 1L Applegate et al., Determinants of Public Punitiveness Toward
Drunk Driving: A FactorialSurvey Approach, 13 JUST. Q. 57, 65 (1997) [hereinafter Applegate et al., Determinantsof Punitiveness];Applegate et al., Assessing Public Suppor supra note 14, at 522-24; Turner et al., supra note 10, at 12-13.
" See, e.g., James Frank et al., SanctioningCorporateCrime: How Do Business Executives
and the Public Compare?, 13 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 139 (1989) (This study varied the culpability of the offender and the harm of the offense.); Valerie P. Hans & M. David Ermann, Responses to Corporate versus Individual Wrongdoing, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 151
(1989) (This study varied whether the wrongdoing was done by an individual or a
corporation.)
,sPETER H. RossI & STEVEN L. NocK, MEASURING SOCIALJUDGMENTS: THE FACroRIAL
SURVEY APPROACH 16 (1982) [hereinafter Rossi & NOCK, MEASURING SOCIAL
JUDGMENTS]; Applegate et al., Determinantsof Punitiveness, supranote 23, at 63-64; Joop
J. Hox et al., The Analysis of FactorialSurveys, 19 Soc. METHODS 493, 493-95 (1991);
Turner et al., supranote 10, at 12-13.
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quately and (arguably) introduce less bias into rating tasks, thus
providing a better opportunity for assessing punishment norms.
It is instructive that other criminologists have recognized
the value of the factorial design method in the study of punishmentjudgments. As Rossi, Simpson, and Miller note, offenders
may:
be regarded as complex social objects that vary from one another in
many, often contradictory ways-crimes committed, losses or damages
inflicted on victims, and social characteristics of both offenders and victims. Hence judgments about appropriate punishments for convicted
criminals are a fitting subject for study through the factorial survey ap16
proach.

To date, a few studies have employed this method to study
punishment preferences, including research on "just punishments" in a Boston SMSA sample,27 on "punishment repertoires"
in American, Japanese, and Russian cities,28 on sources of punitiveness toward drunk driving, 29 and on racial bias in support for
capital punishment. 0 The most extensive use of factorial survey
design to study punishment preferences was Rossi and Berk's
evaluation of public support for the U.S. Sentencing Commission's sentencing guidelines.3 This article reports the results of

26

Peter H. Rossi et al., Beyond CrimeSeriousness:Fittingthe Punishmentto the Crime, 1J.

QUAN=rATivE CRimiNoLOGy 59, 62 (1985) [hereinafter Rossi et al., Beyond Crime Seriousness].
27 See e.g., JoAnn L. Miller et al., Perceptions offustice: Race and GenderDifferences in
Judgments of Appropriate PrisonSentences, 20 L. & Soc'y. REv. 313 (1986) [hereinafter
Miller et al., Perceptions ofJustice];JoAnnL. Miller et al., Felony Punishments: A Factorial
Survey of Perceived Justice in Criminal Sentencing 82 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 396
(1991) [hereinafter Miller et al., Felony Punishments]; Rossi et al., Beyond Crime Seriousness, supranote 26.
2See, e.g.,Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, Is there a "Common Law" of Responsibility?, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 277 (1987) [hereinafter Sanders & Hamilton, Common
Law]; Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, Legal Cultures and Punishment Repertoires in
Japan,Russia, and the United States, 26 L. & SOCY'. REV. 117 (1992) [hereinafter Sanders & Hamilton, Legal Cultures].
See e.g., Applegate et al., Determinants of Punitiveness,supra note 23, at 57.
See e.g., Brandon K. Applegate et al., Victim-Offender Race and Support for Capital
Punishment:A FactorialDesignApproach, 18 AM.J. CRIM. JUST. 95 (1993).
-"PETER H. Rossi & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND
PUBLICVIEWS COMPARED (1997) [hereinafter Rossi & BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS].
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the first national, factorial survey study where respondents rated
crime vignettes by imposing criminal sentences.
Before describing the specific methods used in the present
study, we must first discuss the theoretical framework informing
this study of punishment norms.
III. CLASSIMCATION OF NORMATW STRUCTURES
A. THE ROSSI-BERK MODEL

Rossi and Berk have elaborated criteria to classify normative
structures from survey data. 2 In their scheme, norms are defined as statements of obligatory actions or evaluative rules. As
rules governing action, norms specify what should be done in
particular situations (e.g., "serious crimes should be punished")."3 As evaluative principles, norms state preference orders (e.g., "assault is more serious than larceny") . A normative
domain is defined as the set of norms about a homogeneous
domain of social action." The normative domain addressed in
this paper is punishment for common street crimes. The present research reports the first application of the Rossi-Berk
model to the domain of criminal punishment. While the RossiBerk model has previously been applied to the study of crime
seriousness, 6 it has not been applied to punishment evaluations.
This analysis of normative structures focuses on the way
three components of norms vary among individuals and between population groups. The first of these components is
judgments--in this case, the particular punishments selected for
particular crimes. In relation to judgments, the analysis asks,
*1 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 336-44; Rossi & Berk,
Conceptual Framework, supranote 4, at 84-100.
"Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 333; Rossi & Berk, ConceptualFramework,

supranote 4, at 77-78.

sm
WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 17, demonstrate that consensus exists around the
ranking of seriousness of crimes, based on the type of crime and severity of harm.
mRossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 335; Rossi & Berk, ConceptualFramework,
supranote 4, at 80.
mSee David Rauma, The Context of Normative Consensus: An Expansion of the Rossi/Berk
Consensus Mode4 with an Application to Crime Seriousness, 20 Soc. Sci. REs. 1, 14-16

(1991).
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What kind of punishment do people want to apply to offenders
who commit particular crimes?
In addressing the conflict-consensus debate about the origin
of law, we especially want to know whether, overall, consensus
exists on the appropriate type and amount of punishment for
each type of crime. From a social policy perspective, we want to
know whether there is sufficient agreement on the kind of punishment to impose on criminal offenders, so that social policy
could directly reflect "the will of the people" as expressed in
such surveys.
We are also interested in the second component of norms,
called thresholds-in this case we want to know whether people
adhere to some internal scale of punishment severity, and
whether all people use the same scale. In relation to the conflict-consensus debate, we want to know whether some subgroups of the population (e.g., rich or poor people) use
distinctive scales. If subgroups use their own unique scales, and
if the application of those scales would clearly benefit the subgroup, we would have strong evidence supporting the conflict
perspective on punishment norms. These questions have important implications for social policy, as well. If sentencing laws
are to be based on public opinion, there must be widespread
agreement on the appropriate severity of punishment.
The final component of the analysis is error-inthis case, error refers to the dispersion of punishment preferences around
the population mean. If the dispersion is small, representing
relatively minor disagreements about the kind and amount of
punishment, we may claim that substantial consensus exists. If,
on the other hand, there is wide dispersion, no such claim for
consensus could be made, and the mean of punishment preferences will be an inadequate representation of the will of the
people. Identification of normative domains through surveys is
made difficult by pervasive measurement error. Though normative order may exist, searching for it with real data is always
confounded by measurement error from several sources. Random inconsistencies in judgments of individuals create "noise,"
obscuring any underlying pattern. People, influenced by changing moods or recent experiences, judge the same situation dif-

1998]

APPLYING THE ROSSI-BERK MODEL

ferently every time, and different people understand the rating
task differently.
Rossi and Berk specified nine generalized normative structures, depending on how judgments, thresholds, and error
vary.!7 The first four models all postulate absoluteconsensus with
varying degrees of measurement error (i.e., everyone makes the
same choice, with no variation in choices, and no structure to
the error).
Model I-Absolute Consensus and Uniformity-Every person
has a perfect understanding of the norms and subscribes to
them to exactly the same degree, without any variation or error.8 This would describe a situation where every person independently chooses exactly the same punishment (e.g.,
execution for all crimes and offenders), without any distinction
among offenses and offenders.
Model 11-Absolute Consensus and Uniformity with ErrorOnlyAs in Model I, everyone subscribes to the norms to ezkactly the
same degree, but there are random variations in responses
caused by different understandings or confusion about the task
or variations in mood. 9
Model III-Absolute Consensus and Differentiated Judgments
with No Error-Respondents perceive that different situations
call for different responses; they all make the same choices
without any random variation." If this model described the
domain of punishment norms, respondents would all agree that
different crimes required different punishments. They would
also agree perfectly on the punishment to impose for every type
of crime (e.g., all misdemeanor thefts should be punished by
one year of probation, all robberies should be punished by five
years in prison).

7 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 336-44; Rossi & Berk, ConceptualFramework, supranote 4, at 84-100.
m Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 337; Rossi & Berk, ConceptualFramework,
supra note 4, at 86.
" Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 337-38; Rossi & Berk, ConceptualFramework, supranote 4, at 86-87.
'0 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 338; Rossi & Berk, ConceptualFramework,
supranote 4, at 87-88.
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Model IV-Absolute Consensus, DifferentiatedJudgments and Error-As in Model III, respondents assign different responses to
different situations, but, though they agree completely in their
judgment of every situation, random variation in responses occurs because of mood changes or misunderstandings.4 '
These first four models can be safely ignored because in
modem, complex societies absolute consensus on either generalized norms or specific applications is nonexistent.4 ' Normative
structures in such societies are more complicated; consensus, if
it exists at all, is "relative." That is, people agree on the norms,
but adhere to those norms with different degrees of intensity.
In choosing punishments, for example, people may apply the
same general norm that more serious crimes should be punished more severely. They come up with different punishments,
however, because they have different "thresholds"-people's
scale of punishments vary, with some people preferring consistently harsher punishments than do other people. Brief descriptions of the remaining Rossi-Berk Models, V through IX, all
of which include relative consensus, are given below.
In Model V-Relative Consensus, DfferentiatedJudgments, Varying Thresholds, and Error-people do not agree on each judgment, but their disagreement is not random. Each disagrees, by
some constant characteristic of that individual, from the average
rating of the group. 43 Rossi and Berk refer to this constant as
the individual's "threshold." Thresholds represent individual
variation in strengths of adherence to norms.
For example, most people would agree that robbery and
burglary should be punished by imprisonment. They might also
agree that robbery should be more harshly punished than burglary (i.e., their punishment judgments are differentiated by offense type). The periods of imprisonment they choose for
41

Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 338-39; Rossi & Berk, ConceptualFrame-

work, supranote 4, at 88-89.
42 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 339; Rossi & Berk, ConceptualFramework,
supranote 4, at 89.
4' Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 339; Rossi & Berk, ConceptualFramework,
supranote 4, at 89.
" Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 339; Rossi & Berk, ConceptualFramework,
supranote 4, at 89.
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robbery and burglary vary among individuals. Some variation is
random (i.e., error in judgments exists), but some variation is
systematic: one individual might choose sentences of four and
two years, respectively, for robbery and burglary, while a second
individual might choose sentences of three and one years. The
second individual has a higher punishment "threshold."
Rossi and Berk report several examples of real-world data
that conform to the requirements of Model V (i.e., attitudes toward welfare entitlements and crime seriousness ratings), and
they speculate that most normative domains in modem societies
are best described by Model V.4

In Model VI-Modified Model V, ErrorVariances Correlatedwith
IndividualDifferences-all conditions of Model V apply, but variation in judgments is related to some characteristic of the raters.
According to this model, identifiable subgroups of the population differ on the amount of dispersion around the mean rating
for the subgroup (as would be the case if, for example, there
were greater consensus among women than among men about
the appropriate punishment for a particular crime) .46
In Model VII-Modified Model V, Thresholds Correlated with Individual Characteristics-theconditions of Model V apply, and
thresholds of individuals are consistently correlated with individual characteristics. Here, subpopulations are distinguishable
by the strength of their normative preferences (as would be the
case, for example, if men were consistently more punitive than
were women) . Model VII is of particular interest regarding the
conflict-consensus debate. If an identifiable subpopulation were
consistently more punitive than the general population, and if
its greater punitiveness were consistent with the political interests of that subgroup, such a finding would support the conflict
model of punishment norms.

4' Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 340; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Framework,
supranote 4, at 91.
46 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 340-41; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Framework, supra note 4, at 92-93.
17 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 341; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual
Framework,
supra note 4, at 93-94.
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In Model VIII-Segmented Normative Structures: Global Dissensus and Local Consensus-more than one set of beliefs exists
about the norms of a domain. Identifiable subpopulations adhere to each set, but aggregating across the entire population
obscures agreement within subgroups.48 This circumstance
would exist if, for example, wealthy people's punishment
choices were guided by entirely different principles than were
poor people's. We might find such a condition if wealthy people's punishment choices emphasized the financial harm suffered by crime victims, while poor people gave great weight to
the employment status of offenders.
Finally, in Model IX-Structureless Normative Domains--normlessness exists. Within such domains choices are random.49
Much consumer behavior (e.g., the volatile enthusiasm for fads
in clothing) and public opinion on policy issues that are not salient for people are examples of such domains. With regard to
punishment norms, such a condition would exist if people's
punishment preferences were completely unrelated to characteristics of crimes, victims, and offenders.
B. RESEARCH STRATEGY IN RELATION TO PRIOR RESEARCH

This paper is designed to determine whether any of the
Rossi-Berk models of normative structure adequately describes
the normative domain of punishment for common street
crimes. Data reflecting public opinions about punishment were
first collected. Those data were then evaluated to determine
the degree of consensus in public opinion about punishment.
This evaluation was ordered by the progression in normative
structuring hypothesized in the models: First the degree of
overall consensus was determined. Then, where consensus was
found to be relative (to qualities of the offense, offender or respondent), the factors which differentiated judgments were examined. Punishment thresholds were examined next, followed
by the structure of error.
Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 341-43; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Framework, supra note 4, at 94-97.
49 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 343-44; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Framework, supranote 4, at 99.
48
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Most prior research suggests that punishment norms are
structured according to Rossi and Berk's Model V (Relative Consensus, DifferentiatedJudgments,Varying Thresholds, and Error), but
the evidence is inconsistent. Hamilton and Rytina, for example,
had 391 respondents in the Boston SMSA match hypothetical
crimes with punishments in face-to-face interviews. ° They
found, within individuals, a consistently high correlation between crime seriousness and punishment severity (e.g., relative
consensus-punishment severity was related to the type of
crime-and differentiated judgments, according to the seriousness of the crime) . On the other hand, there was great variation among individuals on the punishments they preferred for
each offense (e.g., respondents had varying thresholds).52
On the issue of error, Hamilton and Rytina found that
higher-income respondents were more likely than others to
agree with average punishments (a condition of Rossi and
Berk's Model VI, which posits that error variances are correlated
with characteristics of individuals)." Hamilton and Rytina also
found that lower-income and black respondents were "less likely
to exhibit the high within-individual correlations between crime
seriousness and punishment severity which pervaded the data
set."54 This latter finding is somewhat consistent with Rossi and
Berk's Model VIII, under which more than one normative structure exists, though Hamilton and Rytina did not identify any alternative norms that lower-income and black respondents may
have used in choosing punishments.
In a vignette study similar to the present one, Miller, Rossi,
and Simpson found no differences in the decision rules by
which men and women determine punishments.5 5 Black respondents were, however, slightly more likely than whites to be

& Rytina, supra note 9, at 1124.
d at 1130.
52 I& at 1132 (The authors did not report summary measures of dispersion for
their entire sample, but did report significant mean dispersion between subgroups.)
53&
Id. at 1140.
Miller et al., PerceptionsofJustice,supra note 27, at 331.
'o Hamilton
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influenced by a complex combination of offender and offense
characteristics.56
Sanders and Hamilton searched for segmentation of retributive justice norms among respondents in one U.S. and two
Japanese cities.57 They found little evidence that justice norms
were segmented by either sex or educational attainment. 8
There was little difference between men and women, or between highly-educated and less well educated subjects, with respect to either punishment thresholds (i.e., whether a
hypothetical offender should be punished) or decision norms
(i.e., what punishment the offender should receive).59
Rauma's analysis of crime seriousness, not punishment
norms, closely parallels the present study.6 Rauma included
crime seriousness rating questions in the 1986 Detroit Area
Study.6 1 Each of the 578 respondents rated, on a ten-point scale,
the seriousness of twenty crime vignettes contained in a selfadministered booklet.62 Rauma explicitly tested the compatibility of his findings with the Rossi-Berk models.
With regard to the decision of what behaviors constitute
crimes, Rauma's findings were consistent with Rossi and Berk's
Model IV; that is, "widely shared norms about what constitutes a
crime that are apparently unaffected by respondent characteristics."63 With regard to the seriousness of crimes, however,
Rauma reported that his findings supported a version of Rossi
and Berk's Model VII; seriousness ratings were correlated with
several respondent characteristics: race, gender, political affiliation, and education.r Respondents who were Whites, Democrats, females, and high school or college graduates gave lower
mean seriousness ratings than did Blacks, Republicans, males,

56 Id.

'7 See generallySanders & Hamilton, Common Law, supranote 28.

5Id. at 285, 287.
59Id.

6See Rauma,

1I

at 14.
12Id. at 14-16.
Id. at 25.
64id

supra note 36.
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and respondents with less than twelve years of education.6
These statistically significant differences between respondent
groups were in the range of 0.7-1.0 on the ten-point scale, or 710% of the seriousness scale range. Whether differences of this
magnitude represent a segmented evaluative structure, as
Rauma suggests, is open to debate.
Rossi and Berk's evaluation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines involved face-to-face interviews with a national probability sample of representatives of 1737 households." Each respondent chose a preferred punishment for each of forty-two
hypothetical offense vignettes that described violations of federal laws. The crime types covered by these vignettes included:
drug trafficking, fraud, kidnapping, extortion, forgery, money
laundering, and robbery, as well as violations of firearms, immigration, civil rights, environmental, and tax laws.
Analysis of the present sfudy, guided by these earlier findings, attempts to resolve whether consensus on punishment
norms exists and, ifjudgments are differentiated, the characteristics of respondents, offenses, offenders, and victims that differentiate them.
IV. METHODS
A. SAMPLE

This study is based on thirty-minute telephone interviews
with a national sample of 1920 adults. The interviews were conducted between August and October of 1987. In line with
Zimmerman, et al.,67 we refer to this study as the National Punishment Survey (NPS).
The interview sample was selected from two computerized
telephone lists. One list was stratified to be representative of all
states, while the other list intensively sampled geographical areas with high concentrations of minority residents. About 1200
respondents came from the first list and 720 from the second.
Id. at 23.
& BErXJUSr PUNImENTS, supra note 31, at 43.
"Rossi
67

Sherwood E. Zimmerman et al., The National Punishment Survey and Public Policy

Consequences,25J. REs. CP

& DEuINQ. 120 (1988).
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The second list was required to obtain a large enough sample of
minority respondents to permit testing the hypothesis suggested
by Rossi and Berk's Model VII: that racial minority group members (in particular, Blacks) adhere to a different normative
structure than do Whites. The overall response rate was 43%.6
The interview sample closely approximated the age, income, and regional distribution of the adult U.S. population; it
deviated, however, on sex, race, and educational attainment.
Females were overrepresented in the sample. Blacks and other
non-whites were overrepresented in the sample, due to intentional oversampling of geographical areas with high concentrations of non-whites. Finally, the sample is, on the average,
better educated than the U.S. population, with college educated
people overrepresented and people with less than a high school
diploma underrepresented. To correct for the sex, race, and
education disparities, cases in the sample were weighted on
these three characteristics. 9 The distribution of responses reported below should, therefore, closely approximate the attitudes of a representative cross-section of American adults.
We recognize that nonrespondents' attitudes may differ
from members of the sample who completed interviews. Nonrespondents may have been more or less punitive, for example.
We cannot assess this possibility directly, of course, but it is instructive that the results we report on crime seriousness approximate closely those found by Wolfgang et al. 0 in their
national crime seriousness study. Further, the results of our re-

The MACATI computer program did not permit saving partial responses, so partial response data were lost. Analysis of call records revealed that 6% of all interview
attempts were partially completed-lasting more than three minutes but terminated
before completion-deflating the response rate by 6%. Most nonresponses were refusals given in the first minute of interview attempts. Due to limitations of time and
money, no attempts were made to convert refusals into completions. Achieving a
high response rate also proved difficult for Thomas, Cage, and Foster, who reported a
46.1% response rate to their mailed questionnaire, as well as Blumstein and Cohen,
whose mailed questionnaires were returned by only 24% of respondents. Thomas et
al., supra note 2, at 112; Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 18, at 230.
69Each case was assigned a weight, the inverse of the sampling proportion for cases
in the respondent's sex/race/education group. Every response was multiplied by
that respondent's "weight" in analyses of aggregate responses.
70See generally WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 1'7.
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search are largely consistent with past studies.7' Accordingly, the
data do not appear to signal any clear way in which nonresponse
may have affected the results reported here.
B. CRIME VIGNETTES

1. ConstructingVignettes.
To assess normative judgments, interviewers read and asked
respondents to rate eight crime vignettes. Each vignette was
constructed by a microcomputer program, through the factorial
survey approach.72 Thirteen "dimensions" were selected to be
included in the vignettes; these dimensions were related to the
type of crime, amount of harm incurred by the victim, offender
characteristics, and victim characteristics. Each dimension varied in its number of "levels." For example, the dimension of offender's sex had two levels (male and female), while the
dimension of offense had twenty-four levels (that is, twenty-four
different crimes).
To construct a given vignette, the computer selected one
level from within each of the thirteen dimensions. Each vignette is, thus, a unique, random combination of information.
As such, each vignette represents a specific circumstance calling
for the application of the norms concerning the proper punishment for crime. Respondents, of course, were asked to rate
the vignettes by stating the sentence the offender should receive. Norms concerning proper punishment are revealed in
the punishments chosen.
A detailed description of the vignette dimensions and levels
is presented in the Appendix. Figure 1 displays a full, sample
vignette, giving an example of each level. •

7, See,

e.g., Hamilton & Rytina, supra note 9.

72See, e.g., RossI & NocK, MEASURING SOCIALJUDGMnS, supra note 25.
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Figure 1
The offender, a twenty-two-year-old male, used a knife to intentionally
injure a victim. The victim, a sixty-year-old female, was treated by a doctor and was hospitalized. The offender had never had a steadyjob. The
offender had a mental condition and was drunk when he committed the
crime. He had never been convicted before for a violent offense, but
had been convicted once before for stealing money or property. He
had served one previous sentence of one year in jail.

Finally, we should note that the construction of the vignettes deviated slightly from complete randomization; a few
specific combinations of levels were excluded because they
would not typically occur in real life. For example, if the offender's age was fourteen, he or she was not "permitted" to have
a criminal history involving six prior convictions for violent offenses; in forcible rape offenses, only males were permitted to
be offenders and females victims. These deviations from completely random creation of vignettes introduced low intercorrelations among the dimensions.
2. Choosing Vignette Dimensions
The dimensions included in this study are, with few exceptions, "legally relevant variables"-characteristics that judges
and parole boards may consider when evaluating a case for sentencing or parole. The primary source for these variables was
the sentencing guidelines and policies established by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission.7 3 The Commission listed in detail
many additional criteria to be considered as aggravating or
mitigating circumstances that could justify harsher or milder
sanctions, within or outside the guidelines.
The offender's and victim's sex are not legally relevant, according to the Sentencing Commission. Sex was included,
however, based on the belief that respondents would find it eas73See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMMSSMON, SENTENCING GUIDEINs AND POLIGY
STATEMENTS (1987).
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ier to imagine a "male" or "female" rather than a "person"
committing an offense. Including sex of offender may have introduced some random error, as some respondents may have
had difficulty imagining some combinations of offender and offense characteristics.
A finite, manageable list of dimensions must be chosen in
any study of this type. Limiting the range of factors to legally
admissible ones was designed to focus respondents' attention on
characteristics that may legally be manipulated in setting punishment policy. Extra-legal dimensions (e.g., race and income)
likely influence criminal justice decisions and punishment preferences, but such considerations are beyond the scope of this
study. Pretests of the interview schedule showed that expanding
the number of dimensions (beyond the thirteen used) to include extra-legal variables would have rendered telephone interviewing unworkable.
The decisions regarding the number of dimensions to include in each vignette and the number of vignettes to pose to
each respondent were guided by several overarching considerations: Telephone interviewing was selected because it was the
only technique likely to produce a large, national sample of responses in a short time. Interview length was limited to thirty
minutes both because longer interviews would be difficult to
complete and excessive length would reduce the quality of responses due to respondent fatigue. Vignettes could have been
very long, including dozens of dimensions, but one very long vignette would have consumed the entire interview. Pilot testing
revealed that eight vignettes could be completed within the
thirty minute limit if they contained only dimensions composed
of major legally-relevant variables.
A comparison between the NPS and the studies by Rossi and
Rauma points up the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches. In their self-administered questionnaire booklets,
Rossi, Simpson, and Miller included fifty vignettes constructed
from twenty dimensions. 4 Rauma 5 also used self-administered

4

Rossi et al., Beyond Crime Seriousnes, supra note 26, at 64-66.
Rauma, supra note 36, at 14.
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questionnaire booklets, in which respondents rated twenty vignettes composed of fourteen dimensions.
Face-to-face interviews permit respondents to rate more vignettes composed of a few more dimensions. They are extremely expensive to conduct with widely dispersed samples,
however; so they typically involve geographically restricted samples. Rossi's respondents all resided in the Boston SMSA, while
Rauma's respondents all lived in the Detroit metropolitan area.
Respondents to the NPS, by contrast, lived all over the U.S. and,
in telephone interviews, each rated eight vignettes composed of
thirteen dimensions.
To permit testing for intra-individual patterns, it would have
been necessary for each respondent to rate at least fifteen vignettes (two more than the number of dimensions).76 This design limitation precludes analysis of response patterns within
individual respondents. Consequently, analysis is limited to aggregate response patterns.
C. SELECTING INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

In the multivariate analyses, the vignette characteristics
serve as independent variables. In addition, however, information was collected on respondent characteristics: age, sex, race,
education, family income, and region (see Table 6 for the categories within each variable). Furthermore, information was collected on the offense seriousness score given to each vignettea procedure that warrants further description.
After being read each vignette, the respondents were asked
to judge the seriousness of the event. The magnitude estimation approach of Sellin and Wolfgang77 was used to measure respondents' perceptions of offense seriousness. This procedure
involved asking respondents to assign numbers representing the
seriousness of offenses relative to a standard offense with a specific score. That is, after listening to a crime vignette, the respondent was asked, "Vhat number would you give this
situation [we just described] to show how serious you think it is
"'Id.at 17; Peter H. Rossi & Andy B. Anderson, The FactorialSurvey Approach: An Introduction, in ROSSI & NOCK, MEASURING SOCIALJUDGMENTS, supra note 25, at 26.
THORSTEN SELLIN & MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, THE MEASURE OF DELINQUENCY (1964).

1998]

APPLYING THE ROSSI-BERK MODEL

269

compared to the bicycle theft with a score of ten?" This part of
the study replicated much of the methodology of the National
Survey of Crime Severity (NSCS), in which 52,000 people were
surveyed by the Bureau of the Census in 1977 as a one-time
supplement to the National Crime Survey.78 Accordingly, comparison of our results with the NSCS is possible, and is presented later in this paper.79
D. SPECIFYING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NORMATIVE
PUNISHMENTS

After respondents rated the seriousness of a crime vignette,
they were asked a series of questions to determine their punAll the commonly available punishishment preferences.
ments-jail or prison, probation, fine, restitution, and (for
homicide offenses only) death-were then offered. Respondents were asked which of these punishment types they would
choose for the offender in that crime vignette. If they chose incarceration, they were asked whether the time should be served
continuously or periodically and how long the sentence should
be. If they chose a fine, they were asked the amount. Respondents could choose as many of these punishment types as they
wished for each vignette.t
17.
in the National Punishment Survey differed in several important
ways from the NSCS:
(1) In the NSCS respondents were interviewed mostly face-to-face; in the NPS in7WOLFGANG ETAL, supranote
7Procedures

terviews were conducted by phone. WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 17, at 39.

(2) The NSCS included crime severity questions as part of a victimization survey,
to which many respondents had replied one or more times before; the NPS study of
crime seriousness and punishment preferences did not include questions on victimization and involved only one contact with each respondent. Id.
(3) In the NSCS only type of offense and amount of loss or harm were given; the
NPS included information about offender and victim. I& at 40.
(4) In the NSCS respondents each rated 21 crimes chosen from 204; each NPS respondent gave opinions about eight offenses chosen from 20, most of which were
taken from the NSCS. Id.
Respondents were also asked a series of questions to elicit the philosophical justifications for their punishment choices for a subsample of vignettes. Analysis of these
justifications is not presented in this paper because the strength of factorial methodology is that it permits examination of norms through people's actions (the choices
people make). The justifications people offer for their actions may obscure the
norms actually guiding their choices.
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A logical possibility exists that respondents would differ in
their perception of the severity of the various sanctions. Were
this the case, it would be impossible to determine whether to attribute differences in punishment preferences to differences in
the desired severity of punishment, or to differences in the perception of the severity of punishments. Erickson and Gibbs
have explored whether people perceive the severity of punishments differently I Using a magnitude estimation procedure
similar to the crime seriousness rating procedure employed in
the present study, they had respondents rate the severity of several types and amounts of punishment. Erickson and Gibbs
found a high degree of reliability in ratings of punishment severity.82 They also found that police respondents consistently
rated punishments as being more severe than did other citizens. 3 These findings by Erickson and Gibbs provide some reassurance that differences in sentencing preferences among
respondents in the present study would be produced largely by
differences in the desired severity of punishment.
V. RESULTS

The analysis presented below is designed to determine
whether any of the Rossi-Berk models of normative structure
adequately describes the normative domain of punishment for
common street crimes. The analysis is therefore organized to
search for consensus on punishment type and amount in the
progressive order hypothesized in the models.
The first set of analyses is guided by Rossi and Berk's Model
V, which hypothesizes, in part, relative consensus and differentiated judgments. The analysis therefore covers the degree of
differentiation (or variability) in punishment type (i.e., imprisonment, probation or fine) and severity (i.e., length of prison
sentence) based on offense characteristics. Next, the sources of
punishment differentiation are examined. These sources include offense type, degree of harm, seriousness (as indicated on
8' Maynard L. Erickson &Jack P. Gibbs, On the Severity of Legal Penalties, 70 J. CRIM.
L. & CRrMIOLOGY 102, 102-16 (1979).
"Id. at 108-09.
"Id. at 116.
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the Sellin-Wolfang scale), and dollar loss (for property offenses).
The analysis then shifts its focus from offenses to respondents, to determine whether punishment preferences are strucHere the most
tured by characteristics of respondents.
important question addressed is whether there are identifiable
subgroups of the population that hold distinctive punishment
norms, as suggested by Rossi and Berk's Model VII. Within this
analysis the relative importance of offense and respondent
characteristics are compared.
The final series of analyses examines the structure of dispersion or error, to determine whether there are subgroups of respondents who share greater consensus on punishment than
does the general population, as hypothesized by Rossi and
Berk's Model VI, and as Rauma found in evaluations of crime
seriousness.'
A. PUNISHMENT VARIABILIY

Selection of type of punishment shows strong normative
features, with incarceration being chosen overwhelmingly by respondents. Across all twenty-four offense types and all conditions, the most preferred punishment was a jail or prison
sentence, chosen for 71% of vignettes. (Variation by offense
type is described in the next section). Some respondents combined other types of punishment with imprisonment: Probation
was added to imprisonment in 30% of cases, a fine in 24%, and
restitution in 35%. It is clear, however, that these alternatives
were seldom preferred as substitutes for imprisonment. As Table I shows, probation was selected as the most severe penalty in

" Rauma, supra note 36, at 25.
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Table 1.
Punishment Preferences Across all Offenses
Punishment
Type

Responses That
Included This
Punishment(a' )
Percent

Death (c)

34.2%

Jail or Prison
Probation
Fine
Restitution

71.4
29.8
24.3
35.2

Responses Where This
Punishment Was the
Most Severe Punishment Selected(b)

(n)
1,872

14,174
14,174
14,174
14,174

Percent
34.2%

71.4
16.6
3.8
3.7

(n)
1,872

14,174
14,174
14,174
14,174

o After they rated the seriousness of the offenses, respondents were read the four
commonly available punishment types in this order Jail or prison, probation, fine,
restitution, and (for homicide offenses only) the death penalty. They were then
asked which of these punishments the offender (if arrested and convicted) should
receive, and told they could choose as many punishment types as they wished.
Where a response included the death penalty, all other punishments were deleted
from the analysis of that response. This column does not add to 100 percent because many responses included more than one punishment type for each offense.
(b)

Punishments were ranked in the following order, from most to least severe: death
penalty, jail or prison, probation, fine, and restitution. Only the most severe punishment of all those chosen for an offense is reported in this column.

o In these interviews, respondents could choose the death penalty for only three
(homicide) offenses; therefore the percentages presented regarding the death
penalty are for responses about these offenses only. Among all 1,872 responses,
41.8% were "No" and 24.0% were "Don't know."
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only 17% of all cases, a fine in 4% and restitution in 4%.,5
The death penalty was an option for only three of the
twenty-four offense types-homicides associated with assault,

robbery, and forcible rape offenses. Capital punishment was
chosen for 34% of the vignettes depicting homicide offenses.
This figure is low in comparison with current levels of support
for the death penalty as measured by general questions. Some
70% of respondents to a national poll in 1987 (the same year as
the NPS) said they "favor[ed] the death penalty for persons
convicted of murder."s" The homicide offenses included in this
study-committed in the context of a rape, robbery and assaultmay not be typical of all "murders." Rape and robbery homicides do constitute felony murders, however, punishable by
death in many states. The observed lower level of support for
the death penalty for specific offenses is consistent with the
proposition that respondents who are given more detail about a
crime form less punitive judgments.
"'Caution should be exercised in inferring from these aggregate data. One can
only say that for the mix of offenses represented by the 15,360 crime vignettes posed
in this study, in 71% of responses imprisonment was the most severe sanction preferred. This aggregate percentage reflects responses to the specific mix of criminal
offenses examined in this study. The proportional distribution of types of offenses
among vignettes does not resemble the actual distribution of crimes resulting in conviction in U.S. courts.
Comparison of the distribution of offenses in the NPS with the distribution of felony conviction offenses in U.S. state courts revealed an overrepresentation of the
most serious offenses in the NPS. See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTCS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JuSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS 1988, at 2 (1990). The authors will fur-

nish this comparison upon request. Zimmerman et al. compared the proportional
distribution of offense types offered in vignettes in the NPS with the actual distribution of offenses resulting in conviction in New York State. They found the less serious
types of offenses-larceny, harassment and DWI-were underrepresented in the NPS,
while some very serious offenses--murder/manslaughter and DWI resulting in a
death-were overrepresented. Zimmerman et al., supranote 67, at 120.
Though the mix of offense types included in the NPS biases the overall set of responses toward severe sanctions (i.e., long prison terms), there is ample justification
for this mix. The 24 offense types included represent common street crimes, about
which the public is concerned, and which constitute a substantial proportion of offenses actually processed by the criminal justice system. The included offenses cover
a wide range in seriousness-from larceny of $10 to rape-murder-and a substantial
number of behavioral elements crucial for sentencing-assault, threats, unlawful entry, weapon use, theft, drug use, sexual content-to providing the opportunity to analyze the structure of punishment preferences across this wide range of concerns.
"6 SOURCEBOOK,supra note 12, at 185.
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B. PUNISHMENT TYPE DIEREN ATION

1. Differentiationby Offense Type
There was considerable variability in preferred sanction type
according to type of offense (see Table 2). A majority of respondents favored imprisonment for all offenses, with the exception of larceny of property worth $10. Imprisonment is
more strongly favored for violent sex offenses than for any other
category of offenses; forcible rape offenses elicited imprisonment as the preferred punishment from more than 94% of respondents. Probation was most preferred as an add-on for
cocaine use and the $10 burglary.
Repeating the pattern over all offenses, no alternative to
imprisonment was preferred as the most severe penalty for any
offense (see Table 3). The most popular application of probation as the most severe sanction was for a $10 larceny (35%),
$10 burglary (33%), and cocaine use (35%). Even in these
cases imprisonment was far more commonly chosen as the most
severe sanction. Fines and restitution did not exceed 20%
(reaching this peak for the $10 larceny) of most severe punishments for any offense.
2. Differentiationby Degree of Harm
Within offense categories, imprisonment was uniformly
more strongly favored for more harmful offenses. For example,
78% favored a prison term for larceny of property worth
$10,000, compared to 55% favoring a prison term for larceny of
property worth $50. This pattern is consistent across all offense
types.
The death penalty, available as an option only for the three
homicide offenses, was most preferred (42%) for forcible rapes
resulting in death, compared to robberies resulting in death
(37%) and fatal assaults (30%).7
"'Thesame caution applies to the interpretation of these results as to the aggregate
data: Respondents gave their opinions of appropriate punishments in relation to specific offense descriptions. The distribution of offense characteristics in the vignettes
may not resemble the distribution of characteristics of all offenses of a particular type
(e.g., all homicides) resulting in conviction in the U.S.
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C. SENTENCE LENGTH DIFFERENTATION

1. Differentiationby Offense Type
Incarceration is clearly the preferred punishment for felony
crimes, but there is less consensus over appropriate prison sentence lengths (see Table 4). Clearly, respondents differentiated
between offense types in assigning sentence lengths. The shortest mean preferred sentence for any offense-burglary of a
building netting $10-was twenty-seven months in prison, with a
median of twelve months. Drunk driving without an accident
received a mean sentence of more than twenty-seven months,
with a median of twelve months.
The longest sentences were for violent assaults resulting in
death. When sentences of "life" and "death" were included (recoded as forty-year sentences), mean sentences for the three fatal assaults were between thirty and thirty-five years, with a
median at the forty-year maximum for all three offenses.
2. Differentiationby Degree of Harm
The five larceny crimes differ only in the dollar value of the
amount stolen-$10, $50, $100, $1,000 and $10,000. These five
crimes were compared to ascertain the effect of varying pecuniary harm to victims. Cumulative response distributions of sentence length preferences for larceny crimes are shown in Figure
2. The vertical axis represents the percentage of respondents
choosing lengths at least as long as the sentence lengths represented on the horizontal axis. Distributions in Figure 2 were
truncated at 180 months to permit examination of detailed differences between curves.
Figure 2 shows a set of similarly shaped curves. The curves
representing the higher dollar value thefts are flatter and have
higher means (i.e., respondents chose longer sentences for
thefts with larger dollar losses).
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Table 2.
All Punishments Selected, by Offense

Punishment Type Selected() (Percent)

Offense Type

Death

Property Theft &Damage
Arson-$500,000
Damage
Larceny of $10,000
Car Theft-Sale-$5,000
Larceny of $1,000
Larceny of $100
Larceny of $50
Larceny of $10
Burglary Offenses
Burglary-Home$1,000
Burglary-Building$10
Robbery Offenses
37.1
Robbery-Gun-Death
Robbery-GunHospital-$1,000
Robbery-WeaponNo Harm-$10
Robbery-ThreatNo Harm-$10

Jail or
Prison Probation Fine

81.5%
78.4
72.9
67.7
62.3
55.3
45.6

27.1%
28.2
36.1
34.4
33.5
38.8
41.9

80.7

31.4

59.6

574

56.5

46.8

47.7

530

61.7

10.6

6.8

16.8

570

92.1

22.5

'2.5

47.6

552

74.5

33.4

R6.5

34.7

486

72.2

32.9

31.4

45.2

605

(Table continued on following page)

24.3%
22.3
26.3
17.9
22.4
24.0
24.0

Restitution n

39.6%
47.4
59.8
43.9
46.1
49.6
48.5
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Death
Offense Type
Assault Offenses
29.7
Assault-Death
Assault-Hospital
Assault-Doctor
Assault-No Injury
Forcible Rape Offenses
41.7
Rape-Death
Rape-Oral SexNo Other Injury
Rape-No Other
Injury
DrunkDriving Offenses
Drunk Driving-Death
Drunk Driving-No
Accident

Jail or
Prison Probation Fine

Restitution n

67.4
82.3
78.3
55.4

11.6
29.1
34.2
39.5

7.6
19.9
28.2
34.3

12.4
42.4
43.9
16.7

557
560
543
484

57.0

5.0

5.3

11.6

633

94.7

18.8

19.6

27.0

583

94.1

21.9

19.2

24.1

553

90.6

21.2

29.5

33.6

555

54.1

40.2

57.8

8.0

541

27.1
49.0
29.8%

35.4
33.9
24.3%

7.8
7.3

565
481

Drug Offenses
Cocaine-Sold for
Resale
Cocaine-Used
Means

89.9
57.9
ob) 71.4%
36.49

35.2%

Respondents were read the four commonly available punishment types in
this order: jail or prison, probation, fine, restitution, and (for homicide offenses only) the death penalty. They were then asked which of these punishments the offender (if arrested and convicted) should receive, and told
they could choose as many punishment types as they wished. Where a response included the death penalty, all other punishments were deleted
from the analysis of that response. The rows do not add to 100 percent
because many responses included more than one punishment type for
each offense.
co)The percentage of respondents who selected the death penalty was averaged over only the three (homicide) offenses for which the death penalty
was an optional punishment.
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Table 3.
Most Severe Punishment Selected, by Offense

Most Severe Punishment Type Selected() (Percent)

Offense Type

Death

Jail or
Prison

Fine or
Probation Restitution Totals(b) n

Property Theft & Damage
Arson-$500,000
Damage
Larceny of $10,000
Car Theft-Sale-$5,000
Larceny of $1,000
Larceny of $100
Larceny of $50
Larceny of $10

81.59 o
78.4
72.9
67.7
62.3
55.3
45.6

11.1%
12.8
19.3
23.0
23.0
29.0
34.6

7.4%
8.8
7.8
9.3
14.7
15.7
19.9

100.0%
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.1

536
733
603
727
751
768
684

Burglary Offenses
Burglary-Home-$1,000 Burglary-Building-$10 -

80.7
56.5

14.4
32.6

4.9
11.0

100.0
100.1

574
530

61.7

1.2

0.1

100.1

570

92.1

5.6

2.2

99.9

552

74.5

19.5

6.1

100.1

486

72.2

19.2

8.7

100.1

605

Robbery Offenses
37.1%
Robbery-Gun-Death
Robbery-GunHospital-$1,000
Robbery-Weapon-No
Harm-$10
Robbery-Threat-No
Harm-$10

(Table continued on following page)
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Death

Assault Offenses
Assault-Death
29.7
Assault-Hospital
Assault-Doctor
Assault-No Injury
ForcibleRape Offenses
Rape-Death
41.7
Rape-Oral SexNo Other Injury
Rape-No Other Injury DrunkDriving Offenses
Drunk Driving-Death
Drunk DrivingNo Accident
Drug Offenses
Cocaine-Sold for
Resale
Cocaine-Used
Total

Jail or
Prison

Fine or
Probation Restitution Totasb)

n

67.4
82.3
78.3
55.4

2.3
14.4
16.3
28.1

0.6
3.2
5.3
16.6

100.0
99.9
99.9
100.1

57.0

0.9

0.4

100.0

633

94.7
94.1

4.3
4.7

1.0
1.1

100.0
99.9

583
553

90.6

6.7
29.4

2.7

100.0

555

16.5

100.0

541

2.5
6.8

100.0
100.0

565
481

54.1

89.9
57.9

7.6
35.3

14,174

The entries in this table represent the most severe penalty chosen among
all the penalties given by each respondent for each offense type.
Some rows do not total 100% due to rounding.
, A total of 15,360 responses were obtained; the remaining 7.7% were recorded as "Don't know" or "No" to all punishment types.

JACOBY & CULLE[

[Vol. 89

Table 4. Jail or Prison Sentence Length, by Offense
Sentence Length() (Months)

Offense Type
Property Theft & Damage
Arson-$500,000 Damage
Larceny of $10,000
Car Theft-Sale-$5,000
Larceny of $1,000
Larceny of $100
Larceny of $50
Larceny of $10
Burglary Offenses
Burglary-Home-$1,000
Burglary-Building-$10
Robbery Offenses
Robbery-Gun-Death
Robbery-Gun-Hospital-$1,000
Robbery-Weapon-No Harm-$10
Robbery-Threat-No Harm-$10
Assault Offenses
Assault-Death
Assault-Hospital
Assault-Doctor
Assault-No Injury
ForcibleRape Offenses
Rape-Death
Rape-Oral Sex-No Other Injury
Rape-No Other Injury
Drunk DrivingOffenses
Drunk Driving-Death
Drunk Driving-No Accident
Drug Offenses
Cocaine-Sold for Resale
Cocaine-Used

Mean

Standard
Median Deviation

n

99.9
67.8
55.5
54.8
43.7
37.4
32.9

60.0
36.0
36.0
24.0
12.0
12.0
12.0

76.7
84.5
76.7
89.8
74.5
59.0
64.3

53.4
27.0

24.0
12.0

72.4
43.7

365.2'b'
123.4
68.0
46.1

480.0
60.0
36.0
24.0

161.5
129.3
91.0
75.1

349.5')
92.7
67.3
42.8

480.0
60.0
36.0
24.0

174.5
109.7
100.2
70.3

416.4e
202.1
184.9

480.0
120.0
120.0

132.9
173.3
155.3

141.2
27.4

84.0
12.0

152.5
53.8

486
258

126.3
66.5

60.0
24.0

142.9
104.4

498
262

442
270

Only responses where a jail or prison sentence was selected, and the respondent
chose a specific sentence length, are included here. All sentence lengths over 40
years and all sentences of "life" were recoded to 40 years, which was considered to
be, effectively, a life sentence.
(b) Sentences of "death," available only for the homicide offenses, were recoded to 40
years for this analysis.
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3. Differentiationby Degree of Seriousness
The offense seriousness magnitude estimation tasks included in the National Survey of Crime Severity produced a
classical power function, as shown repeatedly for a wide variety
of physical stimuli. In the NSCS the power function of offense
seriousness ratings for five0larcenies had the form:
Y = 21.88 X o.2
Y= aX;
Where: Y = magnitude of perceived stimulus (seriousness),
a = Y intercept,

X = magnitude of physical stimulus (dollar loss),
b = slope of the function.

A power function also described the relationship between
dollar loss and perceived seriousness of these crimes in the NPS.
°
This function has the form: Y= 21.5 X 019
Data from both the NSCS and the NPS described above are
plotted on a log/log scale in Figure 3. The two functions have
nearly identical Y-intercepts, though the NPS data have a lower
slope.8 9 The crime seriousness ratings of respondents in the
NPS were less sensitive to increases in dollar value of thefts than
were the ratings of respondents to the earlier NSCS.
This is the first national survey to combine the Sellin-Wolfgang
offense seriousness rating scheme with a measure of preferred
punishment. Respondents gave both an offense seriousness
score and, if they chose a prison term, a preferred length of
confinement. In Table 5 means for these two measures are presented together by offense type. The arithmetic mean is given
for sentence length, while the geometric mean is given for the

Stanley S. Stevens, On the Psychological Law, 64 PSYCHOL. REv. 153, 162 (1957);
Stanley S. Stevens & E. Galenter, Ratio Scales and Categoy Scales for a Dozen Perceptual
Continua,54J. EXPERIvMNTAL PSYCH. 377, 409 (1957).
89
The NSCS and NPS were conducted ten years apart, during which inflation produced a 53% devaluation in the value of U.S. dollars, as measured by change in the
Consumer Price Index. The NSCS data were therefore converted to 1987 dollars and
the results compared to the unadjusted figures. This correction did not change the
slope of the function, but only moved the y-intercept down slightly.
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Figure 3.
Seriousness by Dollar Loss : National Punishment Survey
and National Survey of Crime Severity

seriousness score.9O
Offenses were ranked identically on mean sentence length
and seriousness score through the first four offenses. Some
variability appears in the ordering below that, though offenses
with higher average sentence lengths were generally viewed as
more serious.
'0 The geometric mean is defined as the positive nth root of the product of the
numbers, or the antilog of the mean of the sum of the logs. William G. Hines, Geometric Mean, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE STATISTICS SCIENCES 397, 397 (Samuel Kotz &
Norman L Johnson eds., 1983). The geometric mean is the appropriate measure of
central tendency for ratio scale scores. It reduces the effect on the mean of outliers
in very widely dispersed distributions. In this study seriousness ratings were very
widely dispersed-they ranged from 0.3 to 100 billion-because they were presented
to respondents as having no upper or lower limits.
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Table 5. Sentence Length by Offense Seriousness
Sentence Length
Mean

Offense Type
(Months)
Mean
Rank (n)
1
616
416.4
Rape-Death
2 548
Robbery-Gun-Death
365.2 b
3
536
349.5 b
Assault-Death
Rape-Oral Sex-No Other Injury
4 529
202.1
5 489
Rape-No Other Injury
184.9
6 486
141.2
Drunk Driving-Death
7 498
126.3
Cocaine-Sold for Resale
8 482
Robbery-Gun-Hospital-$1,000
123.4
420
9
99.9
Arson-$500,000 Damage
446
92.7
10
Assault-Hospital
339
68.0
11
Robbery-Weapon-No Harm-S10
532
67.8
12
Larceny of $10,000
13 403
67.3
Assault-Doctor
14 262
66.5
Cocaine-Used
15 420
55.5
Car Theft-Sale-$5,000
16 445
54.8
Larceny of $1,000
17
442
53.4
Burglary-Home-$1,000
46.1
18 406
Robbery-Threat-No Harm-$10
19
408
43.7
Larceny of $100
239
42.8
20
Assault-No Injury
379
37.4
21
Larceny of $50
22 282
32.9
Larceny of $10
23 258
27.4
Drunk Driving-No Accident
24 270
27.0
Burglary-Building-$10

Offense Seriousness
Geometric
Mean
Rank (n)
738.8
629.9
441.7
414.0
390.7
400.8
217.9
266.9
220.7
197.8
178.4
124.4
140.0
89.1
123.2
83.0
133.5
91.3
57.2
86.6
46.7
31.5
95.9
60.6

1
2
3
4
6
5
9
7
8
10
11
14
12
18
15
19
13
17
21
23
22
24
16
20

620
600
572
602
585
594
575
567
544
591
550
751
593
556
618
759
620
645
807
582
826
791
579
546

15,073'
10,135
Totals
Only those responses where ajail or prison sentence was selected, and the respondent chose a specific sentence length, are included here. All sentence lengths over
40 years and all sentences of "life" were recoded to 40 years, which was considered
to be, effectively, a life sentence.
(b)Sentences of "death," available only for the homicide offenses, were recoded to 40
years for this analysis.
o Respondents failed to rate the seriousness of 1.9% of vignettes.
Results of Spearman Rank Order Correlation (with sentence length dependent):
-4.66
Intercept
0.557
Slope
0.956
0.915
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The relationship between mean sentence length and offense seriousness is displayed in Figure 4. The correlation between sentence length and seriousness (r = .956) underscores
the close correspondence between the two variables. Across
twenty-four offense types, 91.5% of the variation in average sentence length is explained by variation in mean offense seriousness.
The close relationship between seriousness and sentence
lengths is attenuated at the individual response level. The correlation between paired seriousness ratings and imprisonment
lengths across all 9997 individual vignettes for which both ratings were recorded is much lower (r = .336). This difference in
magnitude between the two correlations reveals a strong, aggregate, linear relationship between offense seriousness and sentence length; but marked deviations from this pattern exist in
individual pairs of ratings.
The difference between individual vignette correlations and
correlations between aggregated mean ratings indicates the
presence of both considerable error and differing individual
thresholds. Threshold differences represent variations from individual to individual in their ratings on both scales. Respondents agreed, on average, on the ordering of the twenty-four
crimes in seriousness and deserved sentence length. They did
not agree on the appropriate value for seriousness or sentence
length. 91
4. Differentiationby DollarLoss
This relationship is analogous to the relationship between
dollar loss and offense seriousness. Dollar loss can be consid-

"The error component can be viewed as a function of the rating tasks: Seriousness
is measured by a ratio scale; scores have no common unit of measure (e.g., pound or
inch), they have no upper limit, and they are not additive. Each respondent applied
his/her own set of numbers to the concept "seriousness"; so raw scores varied by
many orders of magnitude (as described above), according to whims of respondents.
Interpretation of a score is clearest when this score is compared directly with other
scores produced similarly by the same respondent. In contrast to offense seriousness,
sentence length is an interval scale; individual scores are additive and have a common
unit of measure ("a month in jail or prison") which has a commonly understood
meaning.
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ered an objective stimulus and preferred sentence length interpreted as an indicator of strength of the perceived stimulus.

450
400
350

3009 250

-

S2008 150100

-

500
0

100

600
500
400
300
200
Offense Seriousness (Geometric Mean)

700

800

Figure 4
Sentence Length by Offense Seriousness

Figure 5 shows the linear relationship between logs of dollar
loss and sentence length. Considering only means of these values (not variation among individuals), r = .9942 (r 2 = .989).
Sentence length is a power function of dollar loss. The least
line for this function has the form:
squares regression
0 10 7
Y = 25.69 X .
Where: Y = mean preferred sentence length in months;
X = dollar loss stated in the vignette.
D. CONSENSUS OR DISSENSUS ON SENTENCE LENGTH

Within each category of offenses-theft, burglary, robbery,
etc. -there is a consistent pattern of more harmful offenses receiving longer average sentences. Despite this pattern, dispersion of sentence preferences among respondents is high.
Medians of sentence lengths are only 27-65% of means for all
crimes except capital offenses. Standard deviations are large.
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Point estimates (means or medians) of public preference
are, therefore, misleading. Point estimates, when used alone,
inaccurately suggest consensus.
Returning to Rossi and Berk's analytical model, characteristics of punishment norms found thus far place this domain
within Rossi and Berk's Model V (relative consensus, differentiated judgments, varying thresholds, and error): People distinguish among types of offenses in choosing kinds and amounts of
punishment. They agree on the kinds of punishment appropriate for different offenses. Punishment severity is consistently related to harm; but people do not agree on the amount of
punishment to be applied for each offense (i.e., people have
Whether punishment
different punishment thresholds).
thresholds are patterned by characteristics of respondents (i.e.,
whether Rossi and Berk's Model VI describes the structure of
punishment norms) will be explored below.
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E. PUNISHMENT THRESHOLDS BY RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS

Because of limited interview time, only a few demographic
characteristics were obtained. Differences among respondents
along demographic lines were neither large nor systematic, as
Table 6 shows.
The second column of Table 6 considers only vignettes depicting capital crimes. Preferences for the death penalty for
homicides varied significantly by age, sex, education, and family
income, though not in any clear pattern. Males were significantly more likely to choose the death penalty than were females. Differences by race and region were not statistically
significant.
The third column of Table 6 considers all crimes, showing
the percentage of respondents preferring incarceration as a
punishment. The fourth column displays mean incarceration
lengths. Preference levels for imprisonment were significantly
different by age, education, family income, and region. Two
clear patterns emerged: Respondents with the least and most
education, and Westerners, favored imprisonment least. Although a statistically significant difference appeared in sentence
length by age, this difference is not clearly patterned. Sentence
length differences by sex, race, education, family income, and
region were not significant.
F. RESPONSE SENSITIVITY

In the analyses presented up to this point, there is abundant
evidence that the data are both structured and heterogeneous.
At the aggregate level (i.e., average responses), there is considerable structure, but among individual responses there is
considerable variability. How these seemingly uneven characteristics come about can be seen in the analysis presented in this
section. Here the vignette becomes the unit of analysis.
With each rated vignette as a unit, multiple regression
analyses were conducted on sentence lengths. The regressors
were the levels included in the vignettes, each level coded as a
dummy variable, and the demographic characteristics of respondents, also represented as dummies. These analyses, structured hierarchically (see Table 7), show respondents' sensitivity
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to the various dimensions in choosing sentences, as well as the
importance of demographic characteristics.
Each line in Table 7 refers to a separate regression equation. The first equation contains only the offense types as
dummy variable regressors. Each successive equation includes
all the independent variables from the preceding equations plus
an additional set of dummies, as indicated. The purpose of the
table is to show how much additional variance is explained by
adding successive sets of information to the model.
In the creation of the crime vignettes, assignment of some
characteristics of offenses and offenders was contingent upon
the prior selection of other characteristics (e.g., information
about the age of the victim was given only for crimes involving
personal injury to a victim). Hence n's for later equations are
reduced under the listwise deletion rule. Because orthogonality
exists among vignette characteristics, collinearity among vignette dimensions and levels does not confound judgments
about relative sensitivity.92
The most noteworthy feature of Table 7 is that respondents
were most sensitive to offense type. Offense explains 51% of the
variance in sentence length, as shown in Equation 1. Adding
other regressors in later equations adds little explanatory
power-the highest r in the table is 0.60.
The finding that prior criminal record (whether measured
by number of convictions or incarcerations, or length of prior
incarcerations) had little effect on preferred sentence length is
highly relevant to contemporary changes in sentencing statutes
that provide dramatically longer sentences for defendants with
previous convictions. In apparent contrast to these findings is
the work by Finkel and his colleagues, who studied the responses of college undergraduates to the application of "three

A few pairs of dimensions had collinearity imposed in the design by restrictions
on combinations. Offender's age, for example, had correlations in the .20 range with
number of prior convictions for assaultive offenses and larcenies, and number of
prior incarcerations. Correlations between pairs of dimensions whose combinations
were not restricted were all below .06.
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Table 6.
Punishment by Respondent Characteristics

Characteristic

Selected Death
for Homicides
Percent
(n)

18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+
Total/Mean

25.97%
31.57
28.36
35.39
26.74
41.27
29.75
32.37

S
Male
Female
Total/Mean

35.14
29.90
32.39

31
71
40
40
46
67
14
310

147
163
311

Selectedjail
or Prison'
Percent

(n)

MeanJail or
Prison Sentence
Months
(n)

74.98%
74.55
70.99
76.39
76.05
78.61
77.48
75.20

234
384
346
288
285
281
96
1,917

134.4
134.8
123.8
129.7
152.5
135.5
142.0
135.2

234
380
318
285
284
281
96
1,881

75.09
75.28
75.19

907
1,011
1,919

134.1
136.2
135.2

879
1,002
1,882

75.55 1,617
72.43
250
77.46
22
65.83
4
80.67
24
75.21" 1,920

135.3
136.9
125.0
102.2
126.4
135.2

1,584
247
22
4
25
1,883

R tace/Ethnicity
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Total/Mean

33.30
27.15
49.10
30.22
32.39

(Table continued on following page)

APPLYING THE ROSSI-BERK MODEL

1998]

Characteristic

Selected Death
for Homicides
(n)
Percent

Education
42.39
Elementary
25.83
Junior High
33.42
Some High
School
30.65
High School
Grad
32.12
Some College
30.01
College Grad
30.97
Post-Graduate
32.39
Total/Mean
Family Income
21.65
<$6,000
42.58
$6,000-12,999
37.24
$13,000-18,999
34.94
$19,000-28,999
29.06
$29,000-47,999
30.54
$48,000-74,999
21.15
$75,000+
33.48
Total/Mean

108

SelectedJail
or Prison'
Percent

(n)

Mean Jail or
Prison Sentence
(n)
Months

64.85
79.58
77.10

131
160
238

149.6
134.8
142.3

110
159
234

77.75

728

136.2

727

74.51
73.66
66.36
75.21

308
231
121
1,920

138.5
122.1
118.1
135.2

305
227
118
1,883

77.74
76.48
75.30
71.14
76.35
75.69
75.71
74.93

137
216
234
394
364
168
60
1,575

146.8
134.1
126.4
136.2
133.6
137.5
132.6
134.8

137
216
231
372
363
163
59
1,543

74.59
75.84
76.77
71.32
75.21

347
545
707
318
1,920

135.9
130.6
136.8
139.0
135.2

345
544
703
290
1,883

Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Total/Mean

35.06
27.74
34.60
30.00
32.39

The entries in this column are the percentage of each respondent category
who includedjail or prison among the types of punishment they selected.
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Table 7.
Results of Hierarchical Regression on Sentence Length
Equation
Number Variables Added
Offense type
1
2
Respondent
Characteristics
Prior convictions
3
Offender's age
4
Offense seriousness score
5
Offender's employment,
6
mental illness,
drug/alcohol use
7
8
9

10
11

R2 Added (n)
10,131")
-

R
.7116

R2
.5064

.7229
.7293
.7329
.7395

.5225
.5326
.5371
.5468

.0161
.0101
.0045
.0097

8,341'b)
8,241
8,241
8,097"'

.7406

.5484

.0016

8,097

.7413

.5496

.0012

8,097

.7420

.5505

.0009

8,097

Victim's age

.7496

.5619

.0114

3,579'd)

Offender's and
victim's sex
Weapon used

.7732
.7665

.5978
.5875

.0359
-.0103

2,357")
946)

Number of prior
incarcerations
Length of prior
incarcerations

Values for the dependent variable (sentence length) were not recorded for vignettes where the respondent failed to select "jail or prison" or, where the respondent selected jail or prison but failed to choose a specific period of confinement.
Responses where the respondent
(b) Cases were deleted "listwise" in this analysis.
failed to give all respondent characteristics were excluded.
Cases were deleted for this and subsequent equations if the respondent failed to
give a seriousness score.
(d) This equation includes only vignettes containing offenses involving personal victims
(i.e., assaults, robberies, and forcible rapes). There were the only offenses where
the victim's age was stated in the vignette.
€ This equation includes only vignettes containing non-sexual assaults and robberies.
These were the only offenses for which the victim's sex was given and varied. The
victim's sex was given as female for all sexual assaults.
0 This equation includes only vignettes containing non-sexual assaults, the only offenses for which the type of weapon was identified.
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strikes" laws to property offenders."3 They found that respondents did favor longer sentences for recidivists, but not sentences as long as many statutes provide: "[Survey subjects] do
not limit their punishment to just the last offense when they
know there were six priors, but neither do they dramatically,
geometrically, or exponentially escalate their punishments because of priors."94 After reviewing the research literature on
public attitudes toward imposing more severe sentences on recidivists, Roberts concluded:
Public support is probably restricted to recidivist statutes that target offenders convicted of repetitive violent conduct. Recidivist statutes that
result in long-term or indeterminate detention for relatively minor
property crimes (and that accordingly violate the desert-based principle
of proportionality9 5in sentencing) are in all likelihood contrary to community sentiment.

Roberts, however, noted that the existing research is flawed.
When only offense type and criminal history information are
provided to experimental subjects, the subjects may interpret
the demand characteristics of the experiment as requiring the
assignment of great weight to the criminal history information.9
Roberts concludes: "[a] less obtrusive methodology... would
necessitate embedding the criminal record within a more complex stimulus array."97 The present study offers such a "less obtrusive" method, whereby a broad range of information about
each crime, offender, and victim is provided the subjects, who
must then choose which variables to assign greater weight. The
present experimental conditions would seem likely to yield substantially lower weightings for criminal record than were found
in the studies reviewed by Roberts, where only the type of crime

" See generally NormanJ. Finkel, et al., Recidivism, Proportionalism,and Individualized
Punishment, 39 AM. BEHAVIORAL ScIENTIrT 474 (1996).
"Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, CriminalRecord, and the SentencingProcess,39 AM.
BEHAVIORAL ScmITST 488, 497 (1996).
95

Id.

6Id.

97Id

at 495.
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and the criminal record of the offender were provided respondents.
The normative structure of punishment for crimes centers
on the nature of the crime committed, with little response sensitivity to offender or victim characteristics, although the charac-

teristics of victims matter slightly more than do offenders'.
Respondents' demographic characteristics count for little. Little evidence exists of either threshold effects structured along
demographic lines or of alternative normative structures. In
short, Rossi and Berk's Model V fits the data best. The structure
of sentence length preference norms is dominated by offense
type.
G. SOURCES OF ERROR

The remaining variation is "error," so far as this analysis can
determine. It is not structured in relation to the respondent or
offense characteristics included in this study. We now turn to
analyses that seek to understand the extent to which that error
is structured. 98 To accomplish this we return to the aggregate

level, examining sources of variation in standard deviations
around mean sentence lengths. The objective is to specify
sources of consensus and dissensus in ratings of offense types.
1. Errorby Offense Type
Dispersion around mean sentence lengths varied by offense
type. Multiple regression analysis on standard deviations revealed that about 20% of the variation in standard deviations is
responaccounted for by offense type: disagreement among
9
9
others.
for
than
crimes
some
for
greater
dents was
Within each offense type, much dispersion around the
mean existed. This dispersion was not symmetrical, as shown by
large differences between higher means and lower medians for
all offenses except capital offenses. Most respondents preferred
Miethe has severely criticized previous studies of normative structure, specifically
in relation to crime seriousness, for failing to consider dispersion. Miethe, supra note
9, at 517.
" The standard deviations of sentence length for each offense type are displayed in
Table 4.
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shorter sentences than suggested by the means. Skewness resulted from the very long sentence preferences of a minority of
respondents.1 0
2. Errorby Degree of Harm
Distributions of preferred sentence lengths for the five larceny offenses, in Figure 2, reveal there was little agreement on
appropriate sentence length for any of the larcenies. Each
curve rises rapidly from the origin, then levels off slowly through
a wide range of sentence lengths, indicating a broad distribution of responses across the entire range. There is much overlap in preferred sentence lengths between offenses.
For
example, the median sentence for the most serious ($10,000)
larceny was thirty-six months, but over one-quarter of responses
to the least serious ($10) larceny were higher than thirty-six
months.
Standard deviations increased among property theft and
damage offenses, though not consistently, with amount of dollar
loss. Within other offense categories-burglary, robbery, assault,
forcible rape, drunk driving, and drugs-there are consistently
positive relationships between amount of harm and sentence
dispersion.
3. Errorby Respondent Characteistics
Dissensus may be patterned. Some subgroups of people
may agree to the same extent (i.e., may share a norm to the
same degree), as suggested by Rossi and Berk's Model VI. To
test the applicability of Model VI, a multiple regression analysis
was conducted on standard deviations of sentence length. An
aggregated data set was created, with each case being a unique
combination of offense type and offender characteristics. The
independent variables were respondent characteristics and offense types, all coded as dummies. The dependent variable was
the standard deviation of sentence length. In the first model all
'10This discussion might appear to justify application of the geometric mean to
sentence lengths, as was done with seriousness scores; however, the range of sentence
lengths was only three orders of magnitude (0 - 480 months), while seriousness scores
ranged over 13 orders of magnitude (.3 - 100,000,000,000).

JACOBY & CULLEN

[Vol. 89

variables were included. The resulting multiple R was .458 (R! =
.210). In the second model only respondent characteristics
were included, producing a multiple R of .079 (R2 = .006).
The conclusion of this analysis is that most (21%) of the
identifiable structure in dispersion of preferred sentence
lengths is created by type of offense. Less than 1% of the dispersion was accounted for by all respondent characteristics
combined. Though some demographic subgroups have punishment thresholds different from the general population, no
subgroups were found that have a higher degree of consensus
than the general population has.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was to map the underlying normative structure informing citizens' punishment preferences.
In undertaking this task, we chose to employ a research strategy
that was derived not from theories of law (consensus and conflict), but from the sociological study of normative structures
(the Rossi-Berk model). A major advantage of this model is that
it makes no a priori, ideological assumptions about public opinion. Instead, it provides a systematic scheme for assessing a wide
range of possibilities regarding the underlying structure of punishment preferences. Furthermore, because the model is general (i.e., not specific to attitudes about crime or punishment),
it allows future researchers to explore whether the normative
structure of punishment is unique or similar to other normative
domains.
A. THE STRUCTURE OF PUNISHMENT NORMS

The main finding emerging from these the analysis is that
views of the public on punishments for crimes are normatively
structured. The public, however, disagrees about specific levels
of punishments for specific crimes. This lack of consensus obscures the underlying normative structure. Consensus exists on
punishing crimes according to relative degrees of harm, but littie consensus exists on absolute amounts of punishment. 0 ' The
See also Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 18, at 259; Miethe, supra note 9, at 520;
Peter H. Rossi &J. Patrick Henry, Seriousness: A Measurefor All Purposes?, in HANDBOOK
101
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results of this analysis are consistent with Rossi and Berk's
Model V. These data do not support the more stringent conditions of Rossi and Berk's Model VI or VII, because no significant
segmentation of punishment norms by respondent characteristics exists.
The following general conclusions about popular views on
punishment for crime can be drawn from our analysis:
1. Prisonis the most preferredpunishment
The American public favors imprisonment as punishment
for common street crimes. 02 A normative expectation exists, in
of common street crimes
short, that most offenders convicted
03
term.
prison
a
by
will be sanctioned
2. Punishmentpreferences are differentiatedmost by offense type
Severity of preferred punishment-for both type of punishment and length of imprisonment-is determined mostly by
type of offense. In turn, the most influential quality of each offense type is its perceived seriousness. This finding replicates
findings by Warr et al.'M and Blumstein & Cohen. 05 Relative
consensus exists on the association between punishment and
both objective and subjective measures of harm. This finding is
consistent with that of Thomas et al.,1° who found rank order
correlations exceeding .91 for rankings of punishment severity
by sex, race, age, income, occupational prestige, and education.
OF CRIMINAL JusTIcE EVALUATION

489, 491 (Malcolm W. Klein & Katherine S. Teil-

mann eds. 1980).
' Zimmerman et al., supra note 67, at 130.
See Christopher A. Innes, Recent Public Opinion in the United States Toward Punishment and Corrections, 73 PRISONJ. 220, 227 (1993); Richard C. McCorkle, Punish and
Rehabilitate? PublicAttitudes Towards Six Common Cimes 39 CRIME & DELJNQ. 240, 250
(1993); Warr, PublicPerceptions,supra note 1, at 49-50. t is possible that support for incarceration would have been less pronounced in the NPS if the respondents had
been presented with a wider range of intermediate sanctions as sentencing options.
ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 13, at 212-13. Further, although citizens often prefer
incarceration as a response to crime, their attitudes may be flexible enough to find
non-incarceration as an acceptable, if not preferred, penalty. Turner et al., supra
note 10, at 20-21.
Warr
W0 et al., Norms, supra note 9, at 88.
,'Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 18, at 236.
106Thomas, et al., supra note 2, at 110-16.
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Prison sentence length preferences vary directly with perceived
offense seriousness and (for larceny offenses) with dollar loss,
according to the laws of psychophysics. Mean preferred sentence length is a power function of both mean perceived seriousness and dollar loss. Tremblay1 7 also reported evidence of a
power function between sentence length and dollar loss.
3. Punishmentpreferences are influenced little by the characteristicsof
offenders and victims
Only offenders with long criminal records impress the public as requiring substantially more severe punishment. Very
young offenders are viewed more leniently than are older offenders."" Other factors-such as short records of arrest, conviction, and imprisonment; employment history; drug and alcohol
use; and mental health-are accorded little importance in determining appropriate penalties.
4. Respondents have different punishment thresholds
Some respondents consistently prefer higher and some
lower levels of punishment. Consequently, a wide range of
preferences exists for the punishment of every offense. Unfortunately, the design of the present study, where each respondent rated only eight vignettes, did not permit analysis of the
consistency of these thresholds within individuals. However, in
a similar study where fifty vignette ratings were collected from
each respondent, Rossi et al. found that "respondents' ratings
were internally more consistent than were the pooled ratings."' °
Another way to understand the empirical finding of Rossi and
his colleagues, is that people are consistently "punitive" or "lenient"-in Rossi and Berk's terms, they really do have "punishment thresholds."
07 Pierre

Tremblay, On Penal Metrics, 4 J. QUANTITATIVE CRMINoLOGY 225, 237

(1988)
"o8
See Francis T. Cullen et al., Public Supportfor CorrectionalTreatment: The Tenacity of
Rehabilitative Ideology, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BE-AV. 6, 12, 15 (1990). See alsoJody L. Sundt
et al., The Tenacity of the Rehabilitative Ideal Revisited: Have Attitudes Toward Offender
Treatment Changed?,25 CRIM.JusT. & BEHAv. 426, 437-38 (1998).
"' Rossi et al., Beyond Crime Seriousness, supranote 26, at 88.
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5. No normative segmentation exists
Variability of punishment thresholds does not indicate
normative segmentation of the American public. No demographically structured segments of the population differ substantially in their punishment preferences!" Small but statistically
significant differences in punishment preferences appeared by
respondents' age, education, income, and geographical region.
These findings are consistent with earlier work by Blumstein &
Cohen,' who found statistically significant differences in punishment severity preferences by sex and race, as well as differences between some religious, income, and occupational
groups. Rossi et al." also found comparatively small effects of
demographic characteristics of respondents, accounting for under 5% of the total variance in punishment preferences. Punitiveness thus appears to be more a matter of taste than of status.
Furthermore, differences among respondents are overshadowed
by the much greater differences associated with objective characteristics of offenses.
6. Dissensus about punishment varies by offense type
The extent to which respondents disagree is influenced by
the particular offense being rated: there is greater disagreement
about the punishment for more serious offenses. This disagreement is not patterned by respondents' demographic characteristics. In other words, there is no population subgroup
(identifiable by age, ethnicity, sex, income, or geography) that
has more internal agreement on appropriate punishments than
does the population as a whole.

...
This generalization does not exclude the possibility that punishment thresholds
could be structured by other characteristics that were not evaluated.
. See generallyBlumstein & Cohen, supra note 18.
1 Rossi et al., Beyond Crime Seriousness, supranote 26, at 81.
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7. American punishment norms are structured accordingto Rossi and
Berk's Model V-relative consensus, differentiatedjudgments, varying
thresholds, and error
Punishment norms are characterized by relative consensus,
differentiated judgments, varying thresholds, and error:
(a) "Relative consensus"- People agree on the rank ordering of punishments for crimes, with crimes perceived as more
serious deserving harsher punishment. They generally prefer
imprisonment to other types of punishments for all but the
most minor offenses. This consensus is "relative" to their
(widely varying) internal scales of punishment, however. People
do not agree on the specific punishment for specific crimes.
(b) "Differentiated judgments"-People's punishment
choices are not random. Preferred punishments vary in a patterned way, influenced primarily by their perception of the seriousness of offenses, and much less by other legally relevant
characteristics of offenses and offenders.
(c) "Varying thresholds"-People have a wide range of punishment "thresholds" (i.e., some people are more punitive than
others).
(d) "Error-Wide variations in punishment choices exist,
even within each offense type and for offenses perceived as being equally serious.
The domain of punishment norms does not satisfy the more
stringent conditions set in Rossi and Berk's Models VI and VII,
where error and thresholds are hypothesized to vary with individual characteristics. In short, the normative domain of punishment for criminal offenses is structured the same as other
normative domains which have been studied. Despite the intensity of people's emotional response to crime, the logic they
use in matching crimes and punishments is structured the same
as the logic they apply to their other concerns.
The evidence of widespread consensus on punishment
norms provided in this study provides a counterpoint to the
widespread disagreement about the appropriate response to a
broad spectrum of social problems. When it comes down to the
normative principles which should guide punishment for criminal offenders, there is consensus. The preference for incarcera-
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tion as punishment for most offenses narrows the range of publicly acceptable choices considerably. The rank order of punishment preferences according to crime seriousness further
narrows the range of acceptable punishments.
Rossi and Berk's set of hypothetical normative structures
has proved to be a particularly useful guide to searching for the
level and location of consensus on punishment. We have answered the sequential list of logically related questions implied
by Rossi and Berk's model. In doing so we have systematically
documented the location of consensus and identified the norms
around which this consensus exists.
B. THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Rossi and Berk provide a set of hypothetical normative
structures, a way of searching for the level and location of consensus/dissensus on punishment. We have answered the sequential list of logically related questions implied by the RossiBerk model and, in turn, have attempted to document the location of consensus and identified the norms around which this
consensus exists. The survey data reveal that people want, more
than anything else, for punishment to fit crimes."3 When given
a precisely defined punishment-selection task, people choose a
punishment that is proportional to the perceived seriousness of
the crime.
Characteristics of victims and offenders are much
less influential than objective harm or perceived seriousness.
Further, there is a normative preference to sanction offenders
with imprisonment.
These findings have implications for, but do not constitute a
rigorous test of, consensus and conflict theories of criminal justice. These competing theories do not furnish precise guide"s

See also Hamilton & Rytina, supranote 9, at 1132.

""Most research on perceptions of crime seriousness treat seriousness as synonymous with harm or damage. Crime seriousness has, however, been found by Warr to
consist of two distinct components: "wrongfulness" (i.e., the degree of normative violation) and "harmfulness" (i.e., the amount of damage to the victim). "Seriousness" is
generally interpreted as wrongfulness when a crime is perceived as being more wrong
than harmful. Seriousness is interpreted as harmfulness when a crime is perceived as
being more harmful than wrong. Mark Warr, What is the Perceived Seriousnessof Crimes,

4 CRImtNOLOGXf 795, 821 (1989). The present research did not explore whether respondents applied this distinction.
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lines as to how much consensus or dissensus must exist for a
given perspective to be confirmed. Conflict theory can also
claim that any finding of consensus is really "false consciousness," which, in effect, renders this perspective non-falsiflable
with survey data. Earlier studies focusing exclusively on whether
the public agreed on the specific type or amount of punishment 5 or on the congruence between public preferences and
actual sentencing laws" 6 drew ambiguous conclusions on the
conflict-consensus argument. The results reported here and in
other recent work lend support to consensus theory." 7 The present study looked underneath the surface-the simple expressions of punishment preferences-and found a coherent
structure to those preferences. The existence of this structure
provides reassurance that the U.S. is not splintered into factions
in relation to an issue as fundamental to governing as punishment for crime. Though members of the public disagree on the
specifics, they agree on the general principles that should guide
government in punishing criminal offenders. Absent in the patterned variation in punishment norms is evidence that any demographically defined population subgroup has a substantially
different punishment threshold (i.e., is more or less punitive),
adheres to a distinctively different set of punishment norms
(i.e., puts unique emphasis on particular characteristics of
crimes, offenders, or victims), or shares a higher degree of consensus about appropriate punishment than does the general
population. 18
...
See, e.g., Warr et al., Norms, supranote 9.
"6See, e.g., Warr et al., Contending Theories, supranote 2.
7
" See e.g., Warr, PublicPerceptions,supra note
1, at 49-52.
"aWe note one qualification to these findings. The NPS did not measure respondent's religious affiliation, beliefs, or practices, so punishment practices could vary by
religion or religiosity. As Garland notes: "One of the reasons why the influence of religion upon punishment is so evident [historically] to the observer is that religious
cultural systems are clearly articulated." DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN
SocIETY: A STuDYINSocIALTHEORY 204 (1990). On a general level, Hunter contends
that social science research shows "religion's declining significance as an explanatory
variable. Whether one is a Protestant, Catholic, or Jew simply does not mean very
much when attempting to explain variations in people's attitudes or values." JAMES
DAviSON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEnNE AMERICA 105 (1991). If
denomination per se no longer shapes attitudes, however, evidence is increasing that
"potentially consequential divisions" are occurring within denominations between
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We should caution, however, that it is not clear theoretically
why social cleavages in punishment preferences should be expected. In applying conflict theory, it may be mistaken to expect that opinion would be splintered on all crime-related
issues; the key consideration is whether group interests are markedly affected by the issue being examined. From this vantage
point, general consensus might be expected about punishment
preferences: Norms favoring proportionality of punishment-as
opposed to discretionary, preferential treatment before the
law-may, if anything, be in the interests of less powerful
groups. Even imprisonment may be viewed as a governmental
resource that provides powerless groups protection against
crime victimization."9
In contrast, public opinion may be more divided by group
status when the issues at stake are not whether punishment
should be proportionate, but whether state power actually is applied equitably. Thus, research shows clear racial differences in
opinions about the extent of racial discrimination in criminal

"orthodox" and "progressive" members. Id. at 105. The result is the "polarization of
a religiously informed public culture into two relatively distinct moral and ideological
camps. Id. at 106.
Existing criminological research lends some credence to Hunter's view. Several
studies have shown that, although religious denomination is unrelated to attitudes toward crime, religious fundamentalism is positively related to punitiveness. See, e.g.,
Harold G. Grasmick et al., Religious Beliefs and Public Supportfor the Death PenaltyforJuveniles and Adults 16J. CRRAE &JUST. 59, 72-73 (1993); Brandon Applegate et al., Forgiveness and Fundamentalism: Reconsidering the Relationship between Correctional
Attitudes and Religion 2 (Mar. 12, 1998) (Paper presented at the annual meeting of
the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Albuquerque, NM) (on file with the
authors) [hereinafter Applegate et al., Forgiveness and Fundamentalism]. Even so,
the relationship of fundamentalism to punitiveness is not apparent across all studies.
See, e.g., Applegate et al. Determinants of Punitiveness, supra note 23; Marla Sandys &
Edmund F. McGarrell, Beyond the Bible Belt: The Influence (or Lack Thereoj) ofReligion on
Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty 20 J. CRImE & JusT. 179, 186 (1997). Finally, some
contradictory evidence exists, indicating that certain religious beliefs--such as belief
in forgiveness--are related to less punitiveness. Applegate, Forgiveness and Fundamentalism, supra, at 24. Further research is therefore needed to clarify the extent to
which various dimensions of religious belief systems influence punishment preferences.
"'CompareJohn J. DiIulio, Jr., The Question of Black Crime, 117 PUB. INTREST 3, 1112, 23-24, 31 (1994), with JEROME MMLER, SEAPcH AND DESTRO. AFRICAN AMERICAN
MALEs iN THE CRMINALJuscE

SnSTEM 125-28 (1996).
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punishments20 and about police use of deadly force.12' In any
case, testing the conflict-consensus debate through public opinion is complex and will require more precise propositions about
which attitudinal domains should be marked by social cleavages.
The findings we report also have implications for theories
or justifications of punishment. The pervasive support for the
norm of proportionality-the idea that punishment should fit
the crime-suggests that citizens believe that retribution or "just
deserts" should guide criminal sentencing.12 2 Although this is a
plausible interpretation, two qualifications may apply: First, as
Warr points out, "individuals may invoke seriousness in judging
appropriate punishments for reasons having nothing to do with
retribution. 25 For example, the public may favor longer prison
terms for those committing serious crimes because they perceive
such offenders as being more dangerous, requiring longer periods of incapacitation to secure public safety.
Second, criminal sanctions are both multi-faceted and are
applied to offenders over long periods. Norms of proportionality or 'just deserts" may guide public views toward core features
of sanctioning, but not on all of its aspects. This may be one
reason why surveys that poll citizens about the goals of punishment or on "what the main emphasis of prisons should be" find
support not only for retribution, but also (and at times more
strongly) for rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence. 24
Similarly, in a factorial vignette study, Applegate reports that, although offense seriousness is inversely related to support for
rehabilitation, this relationship explains only a modest amount

'2 Martha L. Henderson et al., The Impact of Race on Perceptionsof CriminalJustice, 25
J. GCRiM.JuST. 447, 453-54 (1997).
121 Francis T. Cullen et al., "Stop or I'll Shoot: "Racial Differences in Support of Police Use

of Deadly Force,39 AM. BEHAVIORALSCaENT 449, 454-58 (1996).
' Warr, PublicPerceptions,supra note 1, at 52.
2 Id.

Brandon K. Applegate et al., PublicSupportfor CorrectionalTreatment: The ContinuingAppeal of the RehabilitativeIdea 77 PRISONJ. 237, 244-46 (1997); Cullen et al., supra
note 108, at 10-13; Mark Warr & Mark Stafford, Public Goals of Punishmentand Support
for the Death Penalty, 21J. RES. CRIME& DEUNQ. 95,99-102 (1984).
1
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of the variation in such support125 Accordingly, it may be that
the underlying normative structures of "rehabilitation preferences" and "punishment preferences" may be different. This is
an area for future research through the application of the RossiBerk model.
Finally, although it seems only a short step from data on
punishment to setting policy, we do not encourage a simplistic
"policy by poll" approach. The sentiments of citizens are not irrelevant to setting public policy, but the exact role they should
play is complex and beyond the scope of this article. More relevant here, there is a risk that even sophisticated surveys-never
mind the one- or two-item polls that receive publicity in the media and are used by politicians-will be misinterpreted.126 Thus,
the willingness of respondents to select very specific sanctions
does not mean that public opinion about punishment is rigidly
fixed. For example, there is no firm consensus on the punishments to impose on convicted offenders. Within the broad
principle that more serious crimes ought to be punished more
severely, for most offenses a broad range of punishments receives support. Almost any specific punishment will find some
supporters and many opponents. Imprisonment length preferences are widely dispersed; therefore setting prison terms at the
means or medians of the distribution of preferences would be
inconsistent with the desires of most people. 27
Furthermore, individuals tend to manifest flexibility in their
punishment preferences: they will revise views on crime control
when complexities are introduced into the decision-making
process. The focus group research of Doble and Doble & Klein
reveals, for example, that people will go beyond retribution in

" Brandon KL Applegate et al., Specifying Public Support for Rehabilitation: A
Factorial Survey Approach 197 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Cincinnati) (on file with authors).

" Durham, supranote 18, at 9-10.

'"Greater consensus may exist around ranges of punishment type and severity than
around point estimates. This hypothesis has not been tested. In such a test respondents might be asked, for example, to specify the most and least severe punishments
they could tolerate for given offenses. It remains for future research to determine if
sufficient consensus exists around ranges of punishments to provide precise guidance
to social policy.
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matching punishments to offenders when they know more
about the realities of punishment. 28 Their preference for long

prison terms is moderated when they know about the costs and
benefits of prison and alternative sanctions. Similarly, the experimental research of Doob & Roberts and Stalans & Diamond
also shows that the more people are told about the details of a
particular case, the less punitive they are.129
Building on this last point, there is a risk of confounding
the interrelated but distinct issues of (1) public views on punishing individual offenders and (2) the complex matter of devising
correctional policy. Punishment norms derived from surveys
such as the NPS speak mainly to the issue of what respondents
feel is an appropriate response to individual offenders. Correctional policies, in contrast, reflect not only considerations of
what sanctions specific offenders (e.g., robbery versus homicide
offenders) should receive, but also an array of organizational,
financial, and political factors-such as levels of prison crowding, funding competing governmental needs (e.g., education),
and evidence of sanction effectiveness. As a result, attempts to
use opinion data to justify specific policy proposals are suspect if
they rely on survey data not designed to address the complexities of the policy under consideration.
These considerations are not meant to imply that the punishment norms identified in the NPS and related research are
methodological artifacts and irrelevant to a deeper understanding of American correctional policy. It would be unwise to attempt to translate public opinions directly into correctional
policy. It would be equally unwise, however, to ignore the constraining influence of public opinion on public policy discourse
and decision-making. Norms that favor fitting punishments to
crimes, usually with prison sentences, exist as expectations
'2 See generally JOHN DOBLE, CRIME AND PUNISHmENT: THE PuBUIC's VIEW (1987);
JOHN DOBLE & JOSH KLEIN, PRISON OVERCROWDING AND ALTERNATIVE SENTENCES: THE
VIEWS OF THE PEOPLE OF ALABAMA (1989).
'2 See Doob & Roberts, supra note 14, at 276; LorettaJ. Stalans & Shari Seidman
Diamond, Biased Recall Effects in Lay Perceptions ofJudicial Leniency in Sentencing
24 (1988) (Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Law & Society Association
in Vail, Colorado) (on file with author); see also Applegate et al., Assessing Public Support, supranote 14, at 528-30.
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whose violation can evoke strong reaction; indeed, the cases of
Willie Horton, Rodney King, and OJ. Simpson illuminate the
salience of these normative expectations. Furthermore, as
Scheingold points out, punishment preferences are political
capital-ubiquitous, if usually quiescent, sentiments-that lawmakers can either brandish against a political opponent or
flaunt while claiming they are dealing with crime by passing yet
another round of "get tough" legislation1SO Accordingly, assessments of the public's views on criminal punishments,
though of limited use for making policy, provide important insights into America's reaction to crime.

"o See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME AND
PunUc PoUcy 43-45, 54-57 (1984). See also KATHERINE BECEETT, MAKING CRIME PAY:.
LAW AND ORDERIN CONTeMPORARYAMERICAN PoITrcs 14-27 (1997).
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APPENDIX
OFFENSE VIGNETTE DIMENSIONS AND LEVELS
Vignette Construction Procedures:
In the construction of each vignette, selection was first
made from Dimensions C (Larcenies) or D (All other offenses).
The selection from C or D was retained regardless of the exclusion of combinations of subsequent dimensions and levels, so
that every level in C and D would be contained in equal (1/24)
proportions among all vignettes constructed.
For each respondent, every dimension except Dimensions C
and D was sampled with replacement (i.e. all characteristics, except offense type, could be repeated in vignettes posed to a single respondent).
Within each dimension, except Dimensions B (Offender's
sex), G (Offender's Employment History), H (Offender's Mental Condition) and I (Drug Dependence and Alcohol Abuse),
every level had an equal probability of being included in every
vignette. The proportionate selection of levels within Dimensions B, G, H and I are specified below.
Some dimensions have a level specified as "BLANK" When
that level was selected for a dimension, no information about
that dimension would be included in the vignette.
DimensionA-Offender's Age
1-The offender, a 14 year old
2-The offender, a 18 year old
3-The offender, a 22 year old
4-The offender, a 28 year old
5-The offender, a 32 year old
6-The offender, a 45 year old
7-The offender, a 65 year old
8-The offender, a
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Dimension B-Offender's Sex
1-male
2-female

(70%)
(30%)

Dimension C-Offense Set #1 (Larceny Offenses)
1-stole property worth $10 from outside a building.
2-stole property worth $50 from outside a building.
3-stole property worth $100 from outside a building.
4-stole property worth $1,000 from outside a building.
5-stole property worth $10,000 from outside a building.
DimensionD-Offense Set #2 (All Other Offenses)
1-broke into a building and stole property worth $10.
2-broke into a home and stole $1,000.
3-did not have a weapon. He/she threatened to harm a victim
unless the victim gave him money. The victim gave him/her
$10 and was not harmed.
4-threatened a victim with a weapon unless the victim gave
him/her money. The victim gave him/her $10 and was not
harmed.
5-robbed a victim of $1,000 at gunpoint. The victim was
wounded and required hospitalization.
6-robbed a victim at gunpoint. The victim struggled and was
shot to death.
7-[INSERT DIMENSION N] intentionally injure [d] a victim.
As a result, the victim died.
8-[INSERT DIMENSION N] intentionally injure[d] a victim.
The victim was treated by a doctor and was hospitalized.
9-[INSERT DIMENSION N] intentionally injure[d] a victim.
The victim was treated by a doctor but was not hospitalized.
10-intentionally shoved or pushed a victim. No medical
treatment was required.
11-forcibly raped a victim. No other physical injury occurred.
12-forcibly raped a victim. As a result of physical injuries she
died.
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13-forcibly raped a victim and forced her to perform oral sex
on him. No other physical injury occurred.
14-drove his/her car while drunk, but did not cause an accident.
15--drove his/her car while drunk, and caused a traffic accident where a victim was killed.
16-stole a car worth $5,000 and sold it.
17-intentionally set fire to a building, causing half a million
dollars worth of damage.
18-sold cocaine to others for resale.
19-used cocaine.
DimensionE-Victim's Age
1-The victim was a 10 year
2-The victim was a 14 year
3-The victim was a 20 year
4-The victim was a 30 year
5-The victim was a 45 year
6-The victim was a 60 year
7-The victim was a 75 year
8-The victim was a

old
old
old
old
old
old
old

DimensionF-Victim's Sex
1-male.
2-female.
3-BLANK
Dimension G-Offender's Employment History
1-The offender was unemployed for a long time, even though
(10%)
he/she had tried hard to get ajob.
(10%)
2-The offender has never had a steadyjob.
3-The offender has held a good-paying job for
(10%)
several years.
4--The offender makes his living mostly from
(10%)
committing crimes.
(60%)
5-BLANK
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DimensionH-Offender's Mental Condition
1-The offender had a serious mental illness.
2-BLANK

(10%)
(90%)

DimensionI-DrugDependence and Alcohol Abuse
1-The offender was under the influence of an illegal drug
(10%)
when he/she committed the offense.
2-The offense was committed to get money to buy drugs.
(10%)
the
when
he/she
committed
3-The offender was drunk
(10%)
offense.
(70%)
4-BLANK
DimensionJ-Offender'sPriorConvictionsfor Assault
1-The offender was never convicted before for a
fense.
2-The offender was convicted once before for a
fense.
3-The offender was convicted 3 times before for
fenses.
4-The offender was convicted 6 times before for
fenses.
5-BLANK

violent ofviolent ofviolent ofviolent of-

Dimension K-Offender's PriorConvictionsfor Property Offenses
1-The offender was never convicted before for stealing money
or property.
2-The offender was convicted once before for stealing money
or property.
3-The offender was convicted 3 times before for stealing
money or property.
4-The offender was convicted 6 times before for stealing
money or property.
5-BLANK
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Dimension L--PreviousIncarcerations
1-The offender had never been sentenced to jail or prison before.
2-The offender had served 1 previous sentence
3-The offender had served 3 previous sentences
4-The offender had served 6 previous sentences
5-BLANK
M-Length ofPrevious Incarcerations
1-(of or totaling) 6 months in jail.
2-(of or totaling) 1 year in jail.
3-(of or totaling) 3 years in prison.
4-(of or totaling) 5 years in prison.
5-(of or totaling) 10 years in prison.
6-BLANK
Dimension N-Weapon Used in Assaults
1-used a gun to
2-used a knife to
3-used his/her fists to
4-used a lead pipe to
5-BLANK

